Impugning Alleged Randomness

Yuri Gurevich Guanajuato, Nov 13, 2014

impugn (Im'pjuin)

— vb

(tr) to challenge or attack as false; assail; criticize


from Old French *impugner*, from Latin *impugnāre* to fight against, attack, from im- + *pugnāre* to fight

New York Times, 1985

TRENTON, July 22 – The New Jersey Supreme Court today caught up with the "man with the golden arm," Nicholas Caputo, the Essex County Clerk and a Democrat who has conducted drawings for decades that have given Democrats the top ballot line in the county 40 times out of 41 times. The court suggested – but did not order – changes in the way Mr. Caputo conducts the drawings to stem further loss of public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process."

The Marker of Dec. 16, 2011

www.news1.co.il/Archive/006 -D-500-00.html: 30-ם מ-1980 ועד פרישתו ב-30 ביוני 1991, כיהן כמנהל אגף המכס והמע"מ.



Lottery

- John organized a state lottery. Every citizen was given one ticket, and his wife won the main prize.
- Is this a mere coincidence or was the lottery rigged?
- What is known about John? Not much. He is devoted to his family and close friends.

Cournot's principle

- How is probability theory related to the real world? Via the Cournot's principle:
- "A predicted event of sufficiently small probability does not happen".
- Known already to Jakob Bernoulli (1713 posthumous Art of Conjecturing).
 Concurred: Émile Borel, Ronald Fisher, Jacques Hadamard, Andrei Kolmogorov, Paul Lévy, ...

How small is sufficiently small?

- This is not a simple question. The answer depends on the application area and may evolve with time.
- Simplifying Proviso: There is an agreed and current probability threshold for the application area in question. Events of probability below the threshold are negligible.

Terminology and notation

- A probabilistic scenario (T, P, E) is given by
 - a trial T with a number of potential outcomes,
 - a probability distribution P, the *null hypothesis*, and
 - a *focal event E* (that will typically be negligible).
- Let's consider such a scenario.

Cournot's principle expounded

If the focal event E is specified before the execution of trial T then it is practically certain that the focal event E does not happen.

Narrow Bridge Principle

If the focal event E is specified (possibly after the trial T was executed but)

without any information about the actual outcome of T

then it is practically certain that the focal event E does not happen.

Bridge Principle

If the focal event E is specified <u>independently</u> of the trial T execution then it is practically certain that the focal event E does not happen.

• But can a specification be a posteriori and yet independent?

ALGORITHMIC INFORMATION THEORY

Kolmogorov complexity

- K(s) = length(shortest program for s)
 Here s is a binary string.
- What is the programming language? In a sense this is not too important because of the Invariance Theorem: $\forall P, Q \exists c (K_P(s) \leq K_Q(s) + c).$

How is K(s) relevant?

- As K(s) becomes smaller,
 s becomes less random,
 more objective and
 more independent of anything.
- Now think of *s* as the description of the focal event *E*.

Critique

- *K*(*s*) is not computable.
- The lack of symmetry.
- Hard to reflect real-world scenarios.

The Kolmogorov centennial conference on Kolmogorov complexity in Dagstuhl at 2003.

TOWARD PRACTICAL SPECIFICATION COMPLEXITY

The idea

- Model the scenario in terms most natural to it. The background matters.
 - Some lottery organizers have been known to cheat.

– Some clerks are too partisan.

 A succinct specification of a focal event in terms of such a natural model may be viewed to be independent of the actual outcome.

Logic models

- Logic models seem appropriate to the kind of scenarios we saw
- Other scenarios may use very different languages and modes.
 - Time series may be appropriate for analyzing stock market.

One-sorted relational structures

- Base set, relations, constants
- Example: directed graphs
- Example: trees
- Vocabulary

Multi-sorted relational structures

- Sorts
- Types of relations, variables, constants
- Example.
 - Sorts Person, Ticket
 - Relation Owns of type Person × Ticket
 - Constant John of type Person
- By default relational structures will be multi-sorted

Logic

- Somewhat arbitrarily, we choose our logic to be first-order logic.
- The logic of textbooks. The most common logic.

Definitional complexity

- Let *M* be a relational structure and *S* one of the sorts of *M*.
- A set X ⊆ S is <u>definable</u> in M if there is a first-order formula φ(x) with
 X = {x: φ(x)}.
- Here φ is a <u>definition</u> of *X*.
- The <u>definitional complexity</u> of X in M is the length of a shortest definition of X in M.

Impugning randomness: the method

Given a probabilistic trial, a null hypothesis and a suspicious actual outcome, do:

- 1. Analyze the trial and establish what background information is relevant.
- 2. Model the trial and the relevant background info.
- 3. Propose a focal event *E* of low definitional complexity, negligible under the null hypothesis, that contains the actual outcome.

By the bridge principle, E is not supposed to happen during the execution. This is a reason to reject the null hypothesis.

Lottery

CloseRelative(John,w) or CloseFriend(John,w)

In other words, the winner *w* is a close relative or close friend of John.

Man with golden arm

$(\exists_{\leq 1}c) \operatorname{nonDem}(o,c)$

There is at most one election (out of 41) where the first candidate c is not a democrat.

THANK YOU

A BAYESIAN TAKE BY ALEX ZOLOTOVITSKI

- A priori probability P(F) of fraud is 0.01 (the percentage of incarcerated in the US).
 How relevant is this probability?
- P(B) = 1 P(F) = 0.99. (B for "benign".)
- P(W|F) = 1. (*W* for the actual win.)
- $P(W|B) = 10^{-7}$. (She has 1 ticket out of 10^{7} .)
- $P(F|W) = \frac{P(W|F)P(F)}{P(W|F)P(F) + P(W|B)P(B)} \approx 0.99999,$ a posteriori probability of *F*.
- $P(B|W) = \frac{P(W|B)P(B)}{P(W|F)P(F) + P(W|B)P(B)} \approx 10^{-5}.$ a posteriori probability of *B*.

- Consider the costs CFP and CFN of a false positive and a false negative, and suppose that jailing one innocent is as bad as letting free 1000 fraudsters.
 Another judgment.
- If CFN = 1 then CFP = 1000.
- Then Cost (toJail) = $CFP \cdot P(B|W) \approx 1000 \cdot 10^{-5} = 0.01$
- Cost(letFree) =

 $CFN \cdot P(F|W) \approx 0.99999$

- So Cost(toJail) < Cost(letFree) Hence the decision: Guilty, go to Jail.
- We can't prove the guilt of the lottery organizer; we can only impugn the alleged probability distribution.