


Bayesian, Fiducial, Frequentist

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Abstract

This paper advances three historically rooted principles for the use of mathematical probability: the *fiducial principle*, *Poisson's principle*, and *Cournot's principle*. Taken together, they can help us understand the common ground shared by Bernoullians, Bayesians, and proponents of other types of probabilistic arguments. The paper also sketches developments in statistical theory that have led to a renewed interest in fiducial and Dempster-Shafer arguments.

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1 Introduction

This paper is inspired by the recent emergence of a movement in theoretical statistics that seeks to understand and expand the common ground shared by Bernoullians¹ and Bayesians and to reconcile their philosophies with more venturesome ideas provided by R. A. Fisher's fiducial argument and its descendants, including the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions.

I argue for three principles for the use of mathematical probability, principles that I believe will advance this search for common ground.

- *The fiducial principle*: All use of mathematical probability is fiducial. It requires, that it is to say, a decision to trust particular probabilities in a particular situation, even though these probabilities are initially purely hypothetical, theoretical, subjective, or derived from other situations, which can never be identical to the situation at hand in all respects.
- *Poisson's principle*: Even varying probabilities allow probabilistic prediction. The law of large numbers, for example, does not require independent identically distributed trials. Moreover, the predictions may concern averages or other statistics rather than the frequencies of particular events.
- *Cournot's principle*: Probability acquires objective content only by its predictions. To predict using probability, you single out an event that has high probability and predict it will happen. Or, equivalently, you single out an event that has small probability and predict it will not happen.

Each of these principles has venerable historical roots. Each is, in some sense, a truism. But the three principles are generally left in the background in philosophical discussions of statistical testing, estimation, and prediction. By making them explicit and salient, we can dispel some of the misunderstandings that have kept Bernoullian and Bayesian statisticians and other philosophers of probability talking past each other.

The fiducial principle identifies a feature common to fiducial and Bernoullian statistical practice that even Bayesians cannot completely escape. Fisher's fiducial argument singles out particular probability statements about the relation between two unknown quantities before either is known and continues to consider them valid after one of the quantities is observed. Bernoullians find a different way to have continued *confidence* in such probability statements after one of the quantities is observed. Bayesians recoil at this brazenness, but they too single out particular probability statements to continue to trust, and they too can never take account of all the evidence they observe.

Poisson's principle helps us see past the widely held but fallacious thesis that Bernoullian statistical theory equates probability with frequency. Stochastic processes, used as models by both Bernoullians and Bayesians, can be far

¹Non-Bayesian methods of statistical estimation and testing are now often called *frequentist*. Following Francis Edgeworth, Arthur Dempster, and Ian Hacking, I will instead call them *Bernoullian*, in honor of Jacob Bernoulli. A variety of other names have been used. See Appendix A.

removed from the picture of repeated trials under constant conditions, and an individual probability in a stochastic process may have nothing to do with the frequency of any event.

Cournot’s principle is integral to Bernoullian statistics, where it is used for prediction (we single out events with high probability and predict that they will happen) and testing (the model or theory is discredited when such a prediction fails). But many statisticians who call themselves Bayesian also rely on this logic of testing.

In the next section I review the historical context and recent developments. In subsequent sections (Sections 3, 4, and 5), I discuss the three principles in turn, trying to keep the mathematical exposition as elementary as possible and providing as much historical perspective as possible. Following a brief summary (Section 6), there are two appendices. Appendix A reviews the history of the adjectives *Bayesian*, *Bernoullian*, and *fiducial* and related terms. Appendix B briefly discusses the game-theoretic understanding of mathematical probability that informs some of the ideas presented here.

2 Context

In this section, I review Fisher’s framework for theoretical statistics, his fiducial argument, its principal difficulties, the Dempster-Shafer generalization, and the crisis of Bayesian practice that has led to renewed interest in fiducial arguments.

2.1 Fisher’s framework

When R. A. Fisher’s work began to attract widespread attention in the 1920s, the British biometric school, which was led by Karl Pearson and included other outstanding contributors such as William S. Gosset and George Udny Yule, had already established international leadership in mathematical statistics. This school’s contributions included new models and methods of estimation and testing, as well as the introduction of correlation and regression and new methods for analyzing time series. Fisher’s further contributions included distribution theory for numerous small-sample statistics, the theory of maximum likelihood, and methods for designing experiments and analyzing variance.

One of Fisher’s most influential contributions was his 1922 article “On the mathematical foundations of theoretical statistics” [78, 2, 106, 200]. This article is most often remembered for its theory of maximum likelihood and the concepts of consistency, efficiency, and sufficiency,² but its most deeply influential contribution may have been its doctrine that theoretical statistics begins with a parametric statistical model, say an indexed class of probability distributions $\{P_\theta\}_{\theta \in \Theta}$, and that the task of theoretical statistics is to use independent observations to estimate the parameter θ . As Fisher put it, theoretical statistics

²The genesis and development of Fisher’s theory of maximum likelihood have been studied by Aldrich [1] and Stigler [201].

begins after the practical statistician has specified “a hypothetical infinite population, of which the actual data are regarded as constituting a random sample.”³ The theoretician’s task is to estimate from this data the “law of distribution of this hypothetical population”, which “is specified by relatively few parameters”.

This Fisherian framework is now so taken for granted, and seems so helpful for understanding aspects of statistical theory in the century before Fisher as well as the century after, that it is difficult to identify the nature of its originality. It captures much of what came before, from Jacob Bernoulli’s estimation of the probability of an event to Karl Pearson’s fitting of frequency curves. Its originality lay perhaps in the extent to which and the way in which it abstracted from practice. For the first time, for example, the constants to be estimated in order to specify a probability law were systemically given a generic name – *parameters* – and were said to describe a hypothetical population “exhaustively in respect of all qualities under discussion”.⁴

The originality and power of the Fisherian framework lay in part in its narrowness – in what it left out. It put the random sample (independently and identically distributed observations) at the center of theoretical statistics, relegating to a peripheral role most of the statistical theory of the preceding century, including time series and least squares, not to mention topics to which Fisher himself was to make pathbreaking contributions: significance testing, multiple regression,⁵ randomization, and the design of experiments. The narrowness can be understood in the context of Fisher’s leadership struggle with Pearson, for Pearson and his fellow biometricians were emphasizing random sampling from biological populations. But most statistical work at the beginning of the 20th century was in fields such as economics, demography, insurance, and meteorology, where time series are central [76, 116]. Even Pearson, Gosset, and Yule contributed to the theory of time series.

For many older statisticians, Fisher’s pronouncements concerning the task of theoretical statistics sounded ridiculous.⁶ But the study of time series as a branch of probability theory was in its infancy in 1922.⁷ So Fisher’s narrowing of the scope of theoretical statistics to the random sample enabled him and his

³What mathematical form might be given to Fisher’s intuitive notion of a random sample from an infinite population? Fisher sketched an answer to this question in a prefatory note to his 1925 paper, “Theory of statistical estimation” [79].

⁴In 1976 [197], Stephen Stigler noted Fisher’s originality in his systematic use of *parameter* and reported finding only a few earlier instances where Fisher’s British predecessors had used the word to designate a constant in a probability law. Similar isolated uses of *paramètre* in French include Bravais in 1846 (cited by Edgeworth, as Stigler noted), Liagre in 1852 [133], and Dormoy in 1888 [66]. In neither language was the usage systematic. In Poincaré’s probability textbook, for example, *paramètre* is sometimes used for what we now call a random variable ([161], page 98 in the 1896 edition, page 121 in the 1912 edition).

⁵As John Aldrich has pointed out [3], Fisher put regression in its modern form by adding the (often fictional) assumption that the values of the independent variable are initially known. This was in 1922, the same year as the article on theoretical statistics [77].

⁶Some of their reservations about Fisher are on display in the discussion following his 1935 presentation to the Royal Statistical Society [82].

⁷Bernard Bru has documented the emergence of the theory of stochastic processes in the 1920s [21]. See also the discussion of the martingale law of large numbers in Section 4 below.

immediate successors to provide a firmer foundation for the subject using the existing probability calculus. The success of this mathematical work has kept the random sample at the center of thinking about statistics even to this day, sometimes in ways we may not recognize.

It can even be argued that Fisher’s narrowing of theoretical statistics opened the way for what we now call Bayesianism. When Fisher came on the scene, Laplace’s method of inverse probability was still widely accepted among British philosophers and statisticians, including Pearson. But for most statisticians it was only a method, not an all-encompassing theory of statistics. It was a method for finding the probabilities of possible causes of an observed event.⁸ There were other uses of probability in statistical work, and even when he wanted to find probabilities for causes, Laplace did not assume that the probability law associated with each cause is necessarily known. Indeed, *Laplace’s theorem* – the celebrated theorem of 1810 now considered an early version of the central limit theorem⁹ – was important in his eyes precisely because it allows us to calculate the probabilities of causes when these probability laws are not known, provided we have many independent observations.¹⁰ In Fisher’s picture, statistical theory is all and only about the probabilities of causes, and the probability law P_θ associated with each cause θ is taken as known, establishing it being the task of the practical statistician, not the theoretical statistician. So the task of theoretical statistics can be completed, it would seem, by means of inverse probability. In the terminology we now use: specify prior probabilities and apply Bayes’s theorem.¹¹

Towards the end of the 1774 memoir in which he introduced inverse probability [120], Laplace gave examples that use what we now call prior probabilities, but he did not emphasize these prior probabilities. His principle of inverse probability, most likely abstracted from an example worked out by Condorcet,¹² did

⁸According to Laplace ([120], Section II), the problems of the theory of chances can be divided into two classes: those in which we seek the probabilities of events from causes, and those in which we seek the probabilities of causes from events. Augustus De Morgan later labeled these two classes of problems *direct* and *inverse*, respectively.

⁹See Bru and Bru [24], Fischer [75], Gorrochurn [98], Hald [104, 105], and Stigler [198].

¹⁰See [24, 98, 104].

¹¹It is generally believed that the French mathematicians who were studying probability in the 1770s were unaware that Bayes had treated the problem of inverse probability in an essay that had been published posthumously in London in 1763. Condorcet apparently first noticed the significance of Bayes’s work around 1780, after Bayes’s literary executor Richard Price had entered into correspondence with Turgot [26, 38]. Laplace first mentioned Bayes’s work in print in his *Essai philosophique sur les probabilités* in 1814 [122].

¹²In an unpublished manuscript, Condorcet applied the principle to a problem involving drawing with replacement from a urn containing white and black balls in unknown proportions, and Laplace used the same problem as the first example of the principle in his 1774 paper. In his painstaking study of Condorcet’s unpublished work, Pierre Crépel was able to show that the manuscript was written before the spring of 1771 and perhaps even earlier ([26], pages 247–263; see also [32], pages 288–289, and [24]). It seems very likely that Condorcet’s example had been communicated to the younger Laplace. Prior to Crépel and Bru’s work, Stephen Stigler had conjectured, based partly on study of an unpublished paper on the theory of errors drafted by Laplace in 1773, that Laplace had persuaded himself of the principle by way of a fiducial argument ([198], pages 100–101; see also [199]). It was in the theory of errors, in any case, that Laplace found the principle to have the greatest importance.

not mention prior probabilities; it simply stated that in light of an event, the probability of each possible cause should be proportional to the probability the cause gives the event. In Fisher’s terminology: obtain a probability distribution for the parameter by normalizing the likelihood.¹³ Laplace later noted that a factor can be introduced to represent prior probabilities,¹⁴ but he seldom bothered with this, perhaps in part because his classical picture of probability began with the identification of equally possible cases, which might be accomplished by dividing more possible cases into subcases that have the same possibility as less possible ones.¹⁵

Once Laplace had his theorem of 1810, he was indifferent between stating his conclusions in terms of inverse probability or stating them in Bernoullian terms; the relevant probabilities follow a normal distribution, to use Karl Pearson’s name for it, and one can say this in terms of probabilities for the quantity being estimated or for the error in the estimate. There may be small theoretical differences, but Laplace ignored them [204, 129, 105].

Karl Pearson worked in this Laplacean tradition. In *The Grammar of Science*, the influential book on the philosophy of science he first published in 1892 [159], Pearson advised readers who wanted to learn about probability to consult Thomas Galloway’s 1839 treatise [90], which taught inverse probability as developed by Laplace and Poisson, without mentioning Bayes or prior probabilities. Pearson quoted Francis Edgeworth [68] in defense of uniform prior distributions: “the assumption that any probability-constant about which we know nothing in particular is as likely to have one value as another, is grounded upon the rough but solid experience that such constants do as a matter of fact as often have one value as another.”¹⁶

In the Laplacean large-sample limit, rough but solid experience might be good enough. Even if prior probabilities are unequal, why should they vary much over the small range allowed by the observations? (See the discussion of the *principle of stable estimation* below.) But in the Fisherian framework,

¹³As Marie-France and Bernard Bru have pointed out, this spared Laplace of any scruples about what a Bayesian would now see as using an improper uniform prior distribution [24].

¹⁴In the statement of the principle of inverse probability in the 1814 *Essai philosophique* [122], for example.

¹⁵In particular, he never used prior probabilities in inverse problems involving continuous observations. As Stephen Stigler has noted, hardly anyone else did either until the 20th century ([203], page 137).

¹⁶The passage quoted is in Chapter 4, §17, “The Bases of Laplace’s Theory lie in an Experience as to Ignorance.” Laplace’s law of succession was integral to Pearson’s philosophy of science. He distinguished between perceptions (sense impressions) and conceptions (theories), and he saw the law of succession in our construction of theories from repeated perceptions. This view echoes Laplace’s associationist psychology [40, 202].

An avid student of German culture [163], Pearson called his philosophy “a sober idealism” in the preface to the second edition of *The Grammar of Science*. Harold Jeffreys, the best known proponent of inverse probability in England in the 1930s, stated in the preface to the third edition of his *Theory of Probability* [111] that *The Grammar of Science* was his primary inspiration. Jerzy Neyman, perhaps the most influential proponent of Bernoullian statistics in the 20th century, stated in 1957 [153] that he had learned from the *The Grammar of Science* “that scientific theories are no more than models of natural phenomena, frequently inadequate models.”

where the P_θ are known and theory focuses on efficiency when the number of observations falls short of the Laplacean large-sample limit, inequalities in prior probabilities do matter, and the obvious alternative to Fisher’s Bernoullian methods is Bayes’s theorem. Little wonder that Fisher denounced this alternative so fiercely.¹⁷

2.2 Bayesianism

From the 1920s into the 1960s, the development of mathematical statistics was led by Fisher and then by Jerzy Neyman, E. S. Pearson, and Abraham Wald, who rejected the use of Bayes’s theorem in statistical analysis because of its reliance on prior probabilities. Neyman, Pearson, and Wald departed from Fisher, however, by emphasizing decisions based on statistical evidence. This emphasis, bolstered by the development of game theory and decision theory in the late 1940s and early 1950s, led to renewed acceptance of subjective probability and subjective expected utility. This led in turn to the development, beginning in the late 1950s, of a new school of thought that called itself Bayesian.¹⁸ Influenced by decision-theoretic arguments that suggested the need for subjective probabilities, and appealing to earlier work on subjective probability by Frank P. Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti, most of the Bayesians considered it unnecessary to justify uniform probability distributions as an expression of ignorance or rough past experience. Each person should settle on their own subjective probabilities.¹⁹

From the beginning, however, most statisticians who call themselves Bayesians, even if attracted to de Finetti’s uncompromising subjective philosophy, have retained a Bernoullian interpretation of the Fisherian framework

¹⁷Fisher eventually convinced himself that Bayes shared his own understanding of probability and that the aspect of inverse probability to which he objected (the use of prior probabilities unsupported by frequency evidence) had been introduced by Laplace [4].


How did Fisher understand probability? Dempster argues that he understood it primarily as degree of rational belief [61], Lehmann contends that he understood it primarily as frequency ([130], and Zabell sees him as vacillating between the two ([227], pages 83–86 and pages 371–374 and 381). We might say, more charitably, that he considered the two aspects inseparable. He would probably have agreed with Edgeworth, who wrote in 1884 that “the object of the calculus [of probability] is probability as estimated by statistical uniformity: the partial belief about some unknown occurrence, as the throw of a die, *together with* the observed fact, or full belief, that any one face is thrown about as often as another.”

In a letter to John Tukey in 1958 ([8], page 233), Fisher wrote, “I use the word ‘probability’ . . . in the sense in which it was used by the old masters, Fermat, Pascal, Leibnitz, Bernoulli, Montmort, de Moivre, and Bayes.” For a late essay by Fisher on the nature of probability, see [86].

¹⁸This story has been recounted by a number of authors; see for example [74]. The introduction of the terms *Bayesian* and *Bayesianism* is discussed in Appendix A. The use of *Bayesian* as an adjective can be found as early as 1948, but its use as a noun does not appear until the 1960s. Nor does *Bayesianism*. Before then, we might say, there were no Bayesians.

¹⁹The name *Bayesian* has also been adopted by authors who have continued to advocate the Laplacean doctrine of inverse probability, with various ways of justifying the objectivity of the prior probabilities. These include Edwin Jaynes [110], Roger Rosenkrantz [169], James Berger [9], and Jon Williamson [221]. The name *objective Bayesian*, perhaps first used by Rosenkrantz, is now often used for this group.

Figure 1: Example used by Edwards, Lindman, and Savage (1963) to illustrate the principle of stable estimation.



The irregular curve is the prior density. The spiked curve is the likelihood function, which can be expected, when there many observations, to have the form of a normal density. A normal density is nearly zero at any substantial distance from its peak. So when we multiply the two curves together to obtain the posterior density, values of the product will be zero far from the peak, regardless of how large the prior density may be there.

$\{P_\theta\}_{\theta \in \Theta}$ and have sought a Bernoullian interpretation for their conclusions about θ .²⁰ Typically they have a plan for selecting and announcing a set of values of θ that has posterior probability near one, and they want each P_θ to predict that this plan will be successful. In other words, for each θ , they want P_θ to give a probability close to one that θ will be in the announced set. They often express this by saying that they want their Bayesian analyses to have good “frequency properties”.

In practice, moreover, Bayesians have hoped for sample sizes large enough that their prior probabilities will not matter too much. This involves an appeal

²⁰Before his interaction with Leonard J. Savage in the 1950s, de Finetti had not worked on mathematical statistics, at least not within the Fisherian framework. When he first dealt with this framework, in 1953 [45], he interpreted it as representing a consensus of conditional opinion: P_θ represents the subjective probabilities everyone would have if they knew the value of θ . Such conditional opinions might be understood in a purely subjective way when θ has some reference in the world aside from the probabilistic predictions it makes, as when it represents the fraction of balls in an urn or the true value of a quantity being measured, but in most cases there is no such reference. In these cases, we might put a Bernoullian gloss on de Finetti’s formulation: θ is the hypothesis that P_θ gives accurate frequencies or withstands gambling strategies, and you would adopt P_θ as your subjective probability distribution if you knew this hypothesis were true.

For discussions of other ways Ramsey, de Finetti, and others have tried to understand objective probabilities in objective terms, see [89, 132, 140].

to another argument with a long pedigree – the argument that the distribution of prior probabilities will not matter too much so long as it is smooth. In an influential article published in 1963, Ward Edwards, Harold Lindman, and Leonard J. Savage called the conclusion of this argument the *principle of stable estimation* [72]. It says that the prior probabilities required by a Bayesian analysis of a Fisherian model have less and less influence as the number of observations grows. The posterior probabilities for a parameter are always a compromise between the prior probabilities and the likelihood, and if the prior is smooth, the likelihood eventually dominates this compromise (see Figure 1.).

Edwards, Lindman, and Savage noted that the mathematics and ideas underlying the principle of stable estimation “have been current since Laplace” (page 202). This may be slightly misleading, because, as I have noted, Laplace did not explicitly introduce prior probabilities into his study of asymptotic inverse probability. Edwards, Lindman, and Savage’s argument probably first appeared in Cournot’s 1843 book ([27], Section 95), where it had a different twist. For Cournot, Bayes’s rule (*la règle de Bayes*) was the same as inverse probability and did not involve prior probabilities.²¹ Cournot did not consider a subjective analysis using unequal or non-uniform prior probabilities. Instead he considered the possibility that the objective probability p of an event is selected according to equally objective but unknown and possibly unequal prior probabilities. After the event has happened in a large number n out of a larger number m of trials, the different possible values of p have unknown posterior probabilities.²² But by the same argument as Edwards, Lindman, and Savage gave for their principle of stable estimation, both these objective posterior probabilities and the probabilities given by Bayes’s rule will be approximately equal, when m and n are large, to the probabilities given by De Moivre’s refinement of Bernoulli’s theorem. For Cournot, perhaps the first Bernoullian, this was the same as saying that they are approximately correct.

Francis Edgeworth may have been the first to use Cournot’s argument in the manner of Edwards, Lindman, and Savage.²³ Arthur Lyon Bowley picked the argument up from Edgeworth and explained it in his widely used textbook, *The Elements of Statistics* [15], beginning with its fourth edition in 1920 (page

²¹From a historical point of view, Cournot was correct. The rule Bayes gave (formula (6) below) was identical with Laplace’s principle of inverse probability. *Bayes’s theorem*, which can use any prior probabilities, was created by later scholars [38]. Cournot introduced the term *la règle de Bayes* into French probability, and until the mid-20th century, it played the same role in French as De Morgan’s *inverse probability* played in English.

²²If we knew the prior probabilities, we could calculate the posterior probabilities by Bayes’s theorem; statisticians now call this an *empirical Bayesian* analysis. But we do not know the prior probabilities.

²³In 1884 ([68], pages 228–229), citing the passage in Cournot just discussed, Edgeworth wrote:

There is not required a precise *à priori* knowledge. . . Almost any *à priori* knowledge, as Cournot has well shown, is sufficient to deduce an overwhelmingly large, though not of course a numerically-measured, probability.

Perhaps Edgeworth misunderstood what Cournot wrote. In any case, he elaborated and repeated his own version of the argument several times; see [70] and the references he gives on page 83 of that article.

414).

Edgeworth’s conclusion, that the subjective prior will not matter if it is smooth, is now often lumped together with Laplace’s theorem (his 1810 theorem that the posterior will be approximately normal and centered on the true value of the parameter), under the name “Bernstein–von Mises theorem”. Many versions of this theorem have been developed, but they are all large-sample results: the number of observations must be many times the number of parameters, and either the parameter space Θ must be finite or stringent conditions must be imposed on the class of smooth prior distributions considered [88].²⁴

2.3 Fiducial and Dempster-Shafer arguments

Fisher consistently argued that inferences about a parameter θ from observations cannot always be expressed by numerical probabilities: sometimes one must stop with the likelihood function. But perhaps he was not completely insensible to the British tradition of logical probability, which always sought a numerical probability for a given proposition on given evidence,²⁵ for by 1930 he had persuaded himself that we can sometimes obtain probabilities for θ posterior to the observations without using prior probabilities [80].²⁶ He called the argument by which he obtained these probabilities *fiducial*.

Fisher presented his fiducial argument by giving examples, not by laying out an abstract theory, but we may safely say that the argument adds more structure to the Fisherian framework $\{P_\theta\}_{\theta \in \Theta}$. Many authors have described this additional structure in terms of a hypothetical random variable u with a known probability distribution, say P , and a *structural equation*²⁷

$$x = G(u, \theta), \tag{1}$$

chosen so that P_θ , for each $\theta \in \Theta$, is the probability distribution for the observation x determined by P and θ when θ is fixed. In Fisher’s examples, the structural equation could be uniquely solved for θ when x is fixed, yielding an equation that we can write in the form

$$\theta = H_x(u); \tag{2}$$

²⁴The name “Bernstein–von Mises theorem” was probably coined by Jerzy Neyman, who explained in 1962 that he had learned the result personally from Sergei Bernstein as a student in 1915 or 1916 and cited a 1919 article by Richard von Mises that contains the result [210]. Lucien Le Cam, who was first a student and then a faculty member in Neyman’s department at Berkeley, used “Bernstein–von Mises theorem” in print in 1956 [125]. See also [124], where Le Cam discusses contributions by Edgeworth, Bernstein, von Mises, and others.

²⁵See Verbugt [208] for an account of the development of logical probability by De Morgan, Boole, and Jevons in 19th century Britain.

²⁶For an examination of the influence of the United States statistician Mordecai Ezekiel on Fisher’s 1930 article, see [2].

²⁷This name *structural equation* was used by Donald A. G. Fraser and others beginning in the 1960s; see [87]. Some recent authors use instead the name *data generating equation*. I prefer to avoid this name, because it suggests that u and therefore x are fully or partly created by chance, perhaps by the goddess called Tyche by the Greeks and Fortuna by the Romans. Montmort and De Moivre believed they had conquered this pagan goddess [7], but she seems to have regained her powers in recent decades.

I will call this the *fiducial equation*. When we observe x and fix it at the observed value, the fiducial equation together with the probability distribution P for u (which we do not observe) determines a probability distribution for θ , the *fiducial distribution*. It merits the name *fiducial* because our decision to adopt it as our probability distribution for θ based on the evidence x amounts to a decision to continue to trust the probability distribution P .

Suppose, for example, that we are about to measure a quantity θ . We know that our measuring apparatus makes errors, and we have a probability distribution P for these errors, based perhaps on past experience. Suppose P is the normal distribution with mean zero and variance one. Our structural equation is $x = \theta + u$, where x is the result of the measurement and u is the error. If we observe $x = 2.3$, say, then our fiducial equation is $\theta = 2.3 - u$. If we continue to trust the probability distribution P , then our fiducial distribution for θ is normal with mean 2.3 and variance one. This example is appealing, first because it is an example (albeit unreasonably simple) of the classical theory of errors, and secondly because it supplies a story about the origin of both the particular Fisherian model (which says that P_θ is normal with mean θ and variance one) and the particular structural equation. In most of Fisher's other examples, however, the Fisherian model was still provided off-stage by the practical statistician, and the structural equation was chosen somewhat arbitrarily from multiple possibilities.

Fisher was never able to shape his examples of fiducial inference into a coherent system, and by the time he died in 1962, his fiducial project had more or less disappeared under a barrage of criticism. Eventually it became clear that fiducial probabilities usually lack a Bernoullian property that Fisher called the absence of *recognizable subsets*. Discussions of this property go back at least to John Venn's *Logic of Chance*, published in 1866 [207]. As Venn pointed out, any individual belongs to many classes, and when we interpret the probability that the individual has a given feature as the frequency of that feature in a class, we must decide on the class. Hans Reichenbach called this the problem of selecting a *reference class* [165]. We do not want to use a given class if we can see that the individual belongs to a smaller class in which the frequency is different, because, as Richard von Mises explained, this would allow an opponent to make money betting against our probability [212].²⁸ Fisher seems never to have cited von Mises or Reichenbach,²⁹ but in 1956 [84], apparently in response to criticism by

²⁸The idea can also be expressed in terms of subjective probability: with respect to the feature in question the individual should be *exchangeable* with the other individuals in the class [42].

²⁹In a letter to A. C. Aitken in 1932 [81], Fisher defended his practice of seldom citing foreign authors:

The fact is that it has always been a cheap way of maintaining a shaky reputation for expert knowledge, to quote some foreigner unknown to most of one's countryman, as of the highest importance. Russians have done long and fruitful service in this respect, owing to their admirably inaccessible language. When you find me browbeating an audience with Japanese authorities, you will recognise the first signs of decrepitude.

Kolmogorov [118],³⁰ he took up the idea in his defense of his fiducial argument, claiming without proof that his fiducial probabilities did not admit recognizable subsets. Shortly after his death, it was shown that this is often not true. It is not even true for Fisher’s favorite example, the fiducial probabilities for a normal mean derived from Student’s t -statistic.³¹

Fisher’s fiducial argument applied only to models with continuous observations (otherwise the structural equation cannot be inverted to obtain a fiducial equation), but in 1957 he suggested that something similar could be done with discrete models such as the binomial, even if this did not produce precise probabilities.³² Arthur Dempster took up this idea in a series of articles in the 1960s, giving methods for obtaining upper and lower probabilities for both continuous and discontinuous models. [51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 58, 59]. Dempster used a structural equation of the form (1) just as Fisher’s argument did, but he did not require that it be uniquely solvable for θ when x is fixed so as to yield a fiducial equation of the form (2). He accommodated values of u for which there are multiple solutions by mapping u to the set of solutions (thus describing a random subset of Θ rather than a random point in Θ), and he eliminated u for which there are no solutions by conditioning on those for which there are, in the manner of Bayes. While being a generalization of the fiducial argument, this procedure also constituted a generalization of the Bayesian calculus, and like the Bayesian calculus it can be used outside the Fisherian framework. I presented it in this general way in my 1976 book, *A Mathematical Theory of Evidence* [176]. In the 1980s it was widely used in artificial intelligence under the name *Dempster-Shafer theory* [226].

Dempster-Shafer belief functions have found their greatest use in domains where statistical models have little traction because it is impossible, impractical, or implausible to model in advance the evidence we might obtain, but where we nevertheless want to quantify and formally combine various items of evidence, including evidence that provides little or no support for either side of some questions being considered. This includes domains such as financial auditing, assurance services, the assessment of intelligence, and judicial deliberation.³³ The most important tools in these domains are the rule of combination, introduced by Dempster in the 1960s, and belief-function discounting, introduced in my 1976 book but used already by Jacob Bernoulli and George Hooper in the 17th century [177, 181].

In 1982 [180], I argued that a Fisherian model and accompanying observations may not provide enough information to permit an analysis using belief functions; what is missing is the evidence that justifies the model. In cases where we can say something about this missing evidence (as when we have a story jus-

³⁰See Fisher’s 22 March 1955 letter to Georges Darmon and his 28 March 1957 letter to E. B. Wilson in [8], pages 79–80 and 239.

³¹See [174, 217, 227] for more analysis and historical information on the fiducial story.

³²See [85]. There are also comments in this direction in the third (posthumous) edition of *Statistical Methods and Scientific Inference* (1973).

³³See [64] and the web site for the Belief Function and Applications Society, <http://www.bfasociety.org/>. For an accounting of my own work on Dempster-Shafer belief functions in the 1970s and 1980s and its relation to my later work, see [185].

tifying a particular probability distribution for an anticipated error), it may be possible to model it ways more amenable to persuasive belief-function analysis. Dempster has repeatedly made related arguments, beginning in the foreword that he wrote for my 1976 book. In a recent article [63], he has pointed that once Bayesian models and analyses are re-expressed in Dempster-Shafer terms (and thus given the additional structure represented by a structural equation), it becomes clear that both the prior distribution and the likelihood function can be weakened to reflect the weakness or absence of underlying evidence.

2.4 The 21st century Bayesian crisis


The Bernoullian and Bayesian theories both continue to flourish in the 21st century. Both have accommodated stochastic processes as well as random samples. But the advent of huge data sets and the concomitant complexity of models have created problems for both. The growth in complexity had already begun to outpace Bernoullian solutions in the 1980s, and this, together with the development of computational methods for Bayesian analyses, allowed the Bayesian theory to mushroom in importance. But the lack of transparency in Bayesian computations with huge numbers of parameters, especially when this number far exceeds the dimensionality of the data, has now also shaken confidence in Bayesian posterior probabilities.

It has become painfully clear how badly the principle of stable estimation fails when the number of parameters approaches or exceeds the dimensionality of the data. It is impossible, before the observations are known, to provide a prior distribution that will give relatively uniform coverage, no matter how the likelihood function comes out, over the perhaps elliptical region of values that this likelihood suggests is possible. When the dimensionality of the parameter space is orders of magnitude greater than the dimensionality of the data, as now happens frequently in fields as disparate as medicine and macroeconomics, prior probabilities dominate the analysis in ways not easily understood. Paul Romer, chief economist at the World Bank, has recently argued that this now happens routinely in the best respected work in macroeconomics [168].

Expositions of the Bayesian method for the one-dimensional case often emphasize the typical case where the prior and the likelihood are both unimodal. In this case, we expect the posterior, since it is a compromise, to have a mode between that of the prior and that of the likelihood. Unfortunately, we cannot expect even this when θ is multi-dimensional. Even in two dimensions, as Minge Xie has pointed out to me, the likelihood function and the prior density will typically be tilted with respect to each other, and then there will be real-valued functions $h(\theta)$, which may be of substantive interest, for which the posterior density, instead of being a compromise between the prior and the likelihood, falls to the same side of both of them.

Figure 2 illustrates this point. Here we have a two-dimensional parameter $\theta = (\theta_1, \theta_2)$. The prior density is centered on $\theta_1 = \theta_2 = 0$, but the maximum-likelihood estimate is $\theta_1 = 0, \theta_2 = 1$. The posterior density is greatest in the region where high contours of the prior density are closest to high contours of

Figure 2: How a Bayesian posterior can fail to be a compromise between the prior and the likelihood. (Example suggested by Min-ge Xie.)



The circle is a contour for the prior density. The tilted ellipse is a contour for the likelihood function. Both suggest that 0 is the most likely value for θ_1 .

The posterior density, being proportional to product of the prior and the likelihood, is greatest in the region where the two contours come closest, suggesting a negative value for θ_1 .

Far from being exceptional, this failure to compromise arises for some feature $h(\theta_1, \theta_2)$ whenever the prior density and likelihood function are tilted with respect to each other.

the likelihood function. In this case of θ_2 , this results in a compromise between the prior and the likelihood – a posterior mean between the prior mean 0 and the maximum-likelihood estimate 1. But because the likelihood function is tilted, we do not obtain a compromise for θ_1 ; the prior mean and the maximum-likelihood estimate are both zero, but the posterior mean is negative.³⁴

The example might seem contrived, but we can expect the likelihood and the prior to be tilted with respect to each other more often than not, and when this happens, and we rotate the picture so that their centers are aligned vertically, then the linear combination of θ_1 and θ_2 represented by the horizontal axis, which might be a feature of interest, will have a posterior that is centered to one side of the vertical alignment, as in the figure. Of course, if there were so many observations that the likelihood were sufficiently peaked, then the effect would be negligible, but this is far harder to achieve in two dimensions than in one and rapidly becomes completely implausible as the number of dimensions increases. More troubling, it is increasingly difficult in high dimensions to see whether this phenomenon affects a particular feature $h(\theta)$ of interest. This problem has been studied in detail by Min-ge Xie and his colleagues; see [224] and [225], pages 27ff and the discussion with Christian Robert on pages 55, 74–75.

The failure of the principle of stable estimation has left 21st century statistical theory in a quandary. This quandary can be seen as a crisis of Bayesianism,

³⁴To make the example more definite, suppose θ_1 and θ_2 are independent and standard normal under the prior, and suppose the likelihood arises from a single bivariate normal observation (x, y) , x having mean θ_1 and variance 1, y having mean θ_2 and variance 0.2, and the two having correlation 0.8. A standard calculation shows that the posterior is bivariate normal, with mean -0.08 for θ_1 and mean 0.97 for θ_2 . In this case the result could be attributed to the strong prior opinion about the correlation. But there are many other ways the tilt between the likelihood and the prior could come about.

but I will argue that it goes deeper, bringing into question not only the meaningfulness of the Bayesian prior for a Fisherian model with a large number of parameters but also the meaningfulness of such models themselves.

2.5 The fiducial revival

The problems just discussed might be summarized by saying first that it is impossible, when a parameter θ has many dimensions, to provide a prior distribution that will not overwhelm the likelihood function for some features $h(\theta)$, and second that this problem has become increasingly important in practice. Statisticians have understood for over half a century that a prior that seems relatively unopinionated about a large number of individual parameters $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n$ will express strong opinions about some other features $h(\theta)$,³⁵ but now that we are working with so many parameters, in models so complex that their interaction is not transparent, this theoretical problem has become a real problem.

To deal with the problem, several statistical theorists have proposed focusing in advance on a feature $h(\theta)$ of interest and seeking posterior distributions for that feature with desired Bernoullian properties. This is hardly consistent with Bayesianism's subjectivist philosophy, and the arguments that produce the posterior distributions are often variants on fiducial or Dempster-Shafer arguments.

The theoretical statisticians exploring this direction of thought have not reached consensus on principles and methods, and I cannot survey their research in detail here. But here are three approaches that have attracted attention:

- **Confidence distributions.** The oldest and most obvious approach, perhaps, is to seek a method that produces nested confidence intervals for $h(\theta)$ at all levels of confidence and then to interpret these nested intervals as a probability distribution.³⁶ This approach was suggested by Bradley Efron in 1993 [73] and has since been developed by a number of authors, most notably Tore Schweder and Nils L. Hjort [172, 173] and Kesar Singh, Regina Liu, Min-ge Xie and their collaborators [225].

³⁵Often cited is Charles Stein's 1959 example of the discrepancy between fiducial and Bernoullian estimates of the sum of squares of many normal means [195]. In this example, x_1, \dots, x_n are normal and independent with unit variances and means $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_n$. We set $h(\theta) := \theta_1^2 + \dots + \theta_n^2$ and $d^2 := x_1^2 + \dots + x_n^2$, and we propose to estimate $h(\theta)$ using d^2 . Because d^2 has expected value $h(\theta) + n$ and variance $2n + 4h(\theta)$, a Bernoullian analysis gives high probability to a confidence interval for $h(\theta)$ of width of order \sqrt{n} around $d^2 - n$. Fisher's fiducial argument for this model produces a probability distribution for $h(\theta)$ that has mean $d^2 + n$ and variance $2n + 4d^2$, which gives high probability to an interval of width of order \sqrt{n} around $d^2 + n$. A Bayesian analysis using a prior that is flat in a very large region of \mathbb{R}^n that turns out to have x_1, \dots, x_n well in its interior will give approximately the same results as Fisher's fiducial argument.

³⁶The name *confidence interval* was introduced by Jerzy Neyman in an effort to explain what he thought Fisher was doing with his fiducial intervals, but the idea goes back to Laplace [129]. Cournot explained how the idea is independent of Bayesian thinking (see [27], Section 107, quoted in Section 3.1 below). Aldrich discusses its use by 20th century authors from whom Fisher drew inspiration [2].

- **Generalized fiducial inference.** In this approach, developed by Jan Hannig and his collaborators [107], one chooses a structural equation $x = G(u, \theta)$ adapted to the feature $h(\theta)$ of interest.³⁷ After the observation of x , a posterior distribution for θ is found using Dempster’s rule of conditioning (a special case of Dempster’s rule of combination); the problem of conditioning on a set of measure zero in the continuous case is handled by first discretizing and then taking a limit. The posterior has desired Bernoullian properties under widely applicable conditions.
- **Inferential modeling.** This approach, developed by Ryan Martin and Chuanhai Liu [142], is also inspired by Dempster-Shafer theory; see [143]. Like generalized fiducial inference, it begins by adopting a structural equation $x = G(u, \theta)$ that determines the parametric model, but it then weakens the probability distribution for u to a Dempster-Shafer belief function (i.e., a random subset in u ’s space of possible values) in such a way that the structural function can be inverted without using Dempsterian conditioning to obtain a Dempster-Shafer belief function for θ that has desired Bernoullian properties for $h(\theta)$.

Inferential modeling produces Dempster-Shafer belief functions that may or may not be probability distributions. The posteriors produced by generalized fiducial inference and confidence distributions are probability distributions (a probability distribution on the entire parameter space in the first case, and a probability distribution just for $h(\theta)$ in the second case), but there may or may not exist (non-data-dependent) prior distributions that will give them as Bayesian posteriors.³⁸

For a review of other methods for ensuring that Dempster-Shafer belief functions have Bernoullian properties, see [65].

3 The fiducial principle

The English words *fiducial* and *confidence* both derive from the Latin *fidere*, meaning “to trust”. The first definition of *fiducial* given by the Oxford English Dictionary is the general and theological one: “of or pertaining to, or of the nature of, trust or reliance”. One example from 1870: “The words . . . appear to . . . fasten on the Lord with a fiducial grip.”

³⁷For example, Hannig has suggested to me that in Stein’s example, described in Footnote 35 above, an appropriate data generating function for the feature $h(\theta) := \theta_1^2 + \dots + \theta_n^2$ might be based on the inverse of the cumulative distribution function for the non-central chi-squared distribution.

³⁸A *data-dependent* prior distribution is one chosen after the likelihood function is observed. It is inconsistent with the rationale for Bayesian reasoning to tailor the prior to be consistent with the likelihood, but some statisticians systematically do this, especially if an initially chosen prior conflicts strongly with the likelihood, as in Footnote 34. Some authors, such as George E. P. Box [16], have defended an iterative process of Bayesian calculation, model checking, and adjusting the prior.

When is a probability fiducial? Leaving aside Fisher’s various answers to this question,³⁹ let us say that a probability becomes fiducial when we decide to trust it even though the evidence for it is weaker than we would like or even though we have other evidence that it ignores.

Once we adopt this broad sense of *fiducial*, we must recognize that practically all probabilities are fiducial when we put them to use. We create probabilities from theory, from conjecture, or from experience of frequencies. But this evidence is never strong enough to fully justify a system of numerical probabilities, and there is always other evidence.⁴⁰ To use the probabilities in a meaningful way, we must decide to proceed nevertheless, and this makes the probabilities fiducial. This is just as true for Bernoullian and Bayesian probabilities as it is for the fiducial probabilities that Fisher invented. In fact, it is glaringly true at the outset for any Fisherian model $\{P_\theta\}_{\theta \in \Theta}$, for we never have enough evidence to fully justify the infinitely precise probabilities given by such a model.

What does it mean to trust a probability or a system of probabilities? Probably the best way to make this question concrete is to rephrase it in betting terms. What does it mean to trust given odds or a given system of odds? There are two distinct answers to this question. One answer, given by de Finetti and many other subjective Bayesians, is that we are disposed to bet at the given odds.⁴¹ A second answer is that we respect them; we believe that no gambling strategy we devise to take advantage of them will make us rich without undue risk. More precisely: no gambling strategy will multiply the capital it risks by a large factor.⁴²

We can qualify in many ways the notion that we trust or continue to trust certain odds or systems of odds. When interpreting this trust as disposition to bet, we can limit the disposition to specific bets, specific situations, specific opponents, and specific times. When interpreting it in terms of skepticism about gambling strategies, we can limit the skepticism to specific strategies undertaken at specific times. The lesson we should draw from the failure of Fisher’s fiducial argument is that such limitations are sometimes needed, and the newer fiducial methods discussed in Section 2.5 impose such limitations.

When we take a closer look at the fiducial character of Bernoullian and Bayesian methods of using probability, we see that they also limit our trust in

³⁹Initially, in his 1930 article, Fisher suggested that fiducial probabilities are probabilities of a different kind. But he soon changed his mind, arguing that they are probabilities like any other, and that they differ from Bayesian posterior probabilities (at least the ones he thought legitimate, those where the prior distribution expresses frequencies in a population from which θ is drawn) only in the argument that produces them.

⁴⁰Permit me to deny, without repeating arguments I have made elsewhere (in [182], for example), the claim that a rational person should have already integrated all of his or her evidence and can find the resulting probabilities by examining his or her dispositions to act.

⁴¹As de Finetti wrote in 1937, “the degree of probability attributed by a given individual to a given event” can be defined by “making mathematically precise the trivial and obvious idea” that it “is revealed by the conditions under which he would be disposed to bet on that event” ([42], page 6). In later work, de Finetti argued that it would be more operational to ask individuals to choose between certain loss functions ([49], Chapter 5).

⁴²This formulation is related to the game-theoretic version of Cournot’s principle; see [183] and Sections 3.4 and 5.2 and Appendix B below.

probabilities in various ways.

3.1 Bernoullian estimation

If an event with probability p happens y times in n independent trials, and n is large, then we can expect y/n to be close to p with high probability. In fact, if we specify a non-zero distance from p and a high probability, then we can find a value of n such that y/n will be at least that close to p with at least that probability. This is Jacob Bernoulli's theorem, first published in 1713. It is justly celebrated.⁴³ As Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Chuprov wrote to commemorate its two hundredth anniversary [156], "everywhere the logic of inference rests in the final account on the theorem of Jacob Bernoulli."

Here is a slightly more formal statement of Bernoulli's theorem: For any $\epsilon > 0$ and any $\delta > 0$, we can find n large enough that the event

$$\left| \frac{y}{n} - p \right| \leq \epsilon \tag{3}$$

has probability at least $1 - \delta$. This has many generalizations, all of which say that under certain conditions certain quantities can be estimated with high accuracy and high confidence. Chuprov's sweeping statement refers to the importance of these generalizations together with the original theorem.

The assertion (3) is uncontroversial when it is made before the trials, when we know n but not y . Should our subsequent knowledge of y change our probability for (3)? Do we know why and how we gained knowledge of y ? Could the process that brought us this information be influenced by the process that determined p ? Is it even possible that someone disclosed this information to us in order to mislead us about p ? Use of Bernoulli's theorem in any particular case is legitimized by the judgement that the additional information (including the value of y and the very fact that we have learned it) is not materially relevant to our use of the high probability for (3). This is a fiducial judgement. Similar judgements are required when we use the many generalizations and applications of Bernoulli's theorem.

Abraham De Moivre improved on Bernoulli's crude calculations by finding an estimate of the probability that the difference (3) will be within given bounds for a given n .⁴⁴ The logic for using this probability in the estimation of p was explained by Cournot in 1843. Here is the explanation, translated from the French but retaining Cournot's symbols: p for the probability we are estimating, n for the number of times the event happens in m trials (so that the frequency is n/m rather than y/n) and P for the probability before the trials are observed that $\left| p - \frac{n}{m} \right| \leq l$:

⁴³Bernoulli considered the difference between the estimated odds $(y/n)/(1 - (y/n))$ and the true odds $p/(1 - p)$ rather than the difference between the estimated probability y/n and the true probability p . Moreover, his calculation can be improved; considerably smaller values of n than the ones he found will do. The important point, as he emphasized, is that we can find such values; statistical estimation is possible in principle. See Stigler 1986 [198], Chapter 2.

⁴⁴This was the first central limit theorem. Again see Chapter 2 of [198] for details.

As we have explained, the probability P has an objective value. It measures in effect the probability of error that we incur when we declare that the difference $|p - \frac{n}{m}|$ falls between the limits $\pm l$. Even if, for unknown reasons, certain values of p are able to appear more often than others in the ill-defined multitude of phenomena to which statistical observations can be applied, the number of true judgements that we will produce by declaring with probability P that the difference $|p - \frac{n}{m}|$ falls between the limits $\pm l$ will be to the number of mistaken judgements approximately in the ratio of P to $1 - P$, provided that we make a large enough number of judgements that chance anomalies more or less cancel each other out.⁴⁵

Here Cournot envisages a sequence of problems in which the unknown p varies but we select an interval of the same probability P each time. (The numbers m and n will also vary, as will the length of the interval.) By another application of Bernoulli's theorem, we will be right P of the time.

Cournot's logic merely elaborated the reasoning of Laplace and Gauss before him, when they derived what we would now call large-sample non-Bayesian confidence limits (see [105], Chapter 8). It also seems fair to say that this logic was the implicit foundation for the exposition of least squares in most manuals on statistics and error theory for the following century (see for example Bowley [15] and Palmer [158]), even if more sophisticated expositions (Poincaré's text [161], for example) evoked inverse probability to justify least squares. Neyman made the same argument as Cournot had made when he called the use of confidence intervals *inductive behavior* in 1957 [153].⁴⁶

Is P still a probability after the observations are made? Neyman said no. As he explained to de Finetti in 1939,

My expression "confidence coefficient" designates the *value* of the probability that an estimation is correct, a value chosen arbitrarily in advance; so this expression is not a synonym for the term "probability".⁴⁷

⁴⁵Here is the French original of the translated passage ([27], Section 107):

La probabilité P a, comme nous l'avons expliqué, une valeur objective; elle mesure effectivement la probabilité de l'erreur du jugement que nous portons, en prononçant que la différence $|p - \frac{n}{m}|$ tombe entre les limites $\pm l$. Lors même que, dans la multitude indéfinie de faits auxquels peuvent s'appliquer les observations statistiques, des raisons inconnues rendraient certains valeurs de p habiles à se produire plus fréquemment que d'autres, le nombre des jugements vrais que nous émettrions, en prononçant, d'après la probabilité P , que la différence $|p - \frac{n}{m}|$ tombe entre les limites $\pm l$, serait au nombre des jugements erronés sensiblement dans le rapport de P à $1 - P$, si d'ailleurs on embrassait une série de jugements assez nombreux pour que les anomalies fortuites aient dû se compenser sensiblement.

⁴⁶Neyman introduced the term *confidence interval* in English in 1934 [150]. It is often thought that he developed the definition and introduced the name in reaction to Fisher's fiducial argument, but in 1941 [152] he explained that he had developed and used the concept in Poland around 1930, without knowing about Fisher's work, and that the name *confidence interval* was a translation of the Polish *przedział ufności*.

⁴⁷Neyman wrote to de Finetti in French:

The fiducial principle can free us, however, from debates about whether a particular number used in a particular way is or is not a probability. We can trust or continue to trust a probability in different ways, and we need not subscribe to a doctrine, be it de Finetti's or Fisher's, that prescribes a panoply of ways we must trust it in order to continue to call it a probability.

3.2 Bayesian estimation

Bayesian estimation is usually explained in a formal way. Bayes's theorem is deduced from the definition of conditional probability and used in a Fisherian model in which the probabilities appear as conditional probabilities given the parameters. Attention is then directed to the choice of initial probabilities for the parameters, and the philosophical discussion revolves around the subjectivity of this choice.

The subjectively chosen initial or prior probabilities are evidently fiducial, for they are necessarily based on scanty evidence. Even "objective Bayesians", who believe that given evidence determines probabilities objectively, generally concede that they lack the resources to calculate or otherwise determine those probabilities precisely. As Alan Turing put it ([206], Section 1.3; [229]), "When the whole evidence about some event is taken into account it may be extremely difficult to estimate the probability of the event, even very approximately, and it may be better to form an estimate based on a part of the evidence, so that the probability may be more easily calculated."

Moreover, the use of Bayes's theorem adds further fiducial judgements. In Thomas Bayes's time, there was no such thing as conditional probability – no such general concept, no formal definition, and certainly no notation for it. But earlier writers had considered events that happen or fail in sequence, and they had considered how probabilities for later events change as earlier ones happen. Abraham De Moivre, for example, considered an event A and a later event B and showed that the probability of B after A happens, for which I will write $P(B|A)$,⁴⁸ should satisfy

$$P(A\&B) = P(A)P(B|A), \tag{4}$$

where $P(A)$ and $P(A\&B)$ are the initial probabilities for A and $A\&B$, respectively. The equality (4) has long been called the *rule of compound probability*. It implies, of course, that

$$P(B|A) = \frac{P(A\&B)}{P(A)}.$$

L'expression "coefficient de confiance" employée par moi désigne une *valeur* de la probabilité pour qu'une estimation soit correcte, une valeur choisit arbitrairement d'avance; par conséquent cette expression n'est pas un synonyme du terme "probabilité".

De Finetti quotes him on page 29 of [43].

⁴⁸I hasten to repeat that De Moivre had no such notation.

De Moivre’s argument for the rule of compound probability was based on the betting definition (or the game-theoretic definition, as we can now call it) of probability: the probability of an event is the amount you must risk to end up with one monetary unit if the event happens.⁴⁹ To turn $P(A)P(B|A)$ into one monetary unit if $A\&B$ happens, you first bet it all on A ; this gives you $P(B|A)$ if A does happen, in which case you bet this on B .

In his famous essay on probability, published posthumously in 1763, Bayes repeated De Moivre’s proposition and proof; this was his third proposition. But he also tried to prove an analogous result backwards in time: if you learn B has happened without knowing whether the earlier event A has happened, you should change your probability for A from $P(A)$ to

$$\frac{P(A\&B)}{P(B)}. \tag{5}$$

This is the fifth proposition in Bayes’s essay, but his proof was hardly a proof. He imagined a sequence $(A_1, B_1), (A_2, B_2), \dots$ of events ordered in time and posited that we will be told nothing about which ones happen until the first B happens. Then we will be told that this B has happened, and we will bet on the A that is paired with it. Thus we know in advance that we will be told B and will have no other information. The argument for changing from $P(A)$ to the ratio (5) is then convincing. But this does not establish that the change makes sense in other cases, where we may have other information, or we may not have known in advance what we would be told and when, so that the very fact that are told about B without being told about A is itself information [179]. To use Bayes’s fifth proposition, we must make the fiducial judgement that this additional information is irrelevant. We must decide, as Bruno de Finetti explained centuries later, that this additional information does not change our attitude towards certain bets.⁵⁰

Were we to accept Bayes’s fifth proposition, and were we then to adopt uniform prior probabilities for an unknown prior probability p , then we could derive Bayes’s formula for Bernoulli’s problem of estimating p from y happenings

⁴⁹For example, if Player I announces the probability 0.05 for A , then Player II is allowed to bet on A at the odds 1 : 19. By betting 5 cents on A , he increases the 5 cents to 1 dollar if A happens and loses only the 5 cents if A fails.

⁵⁰De Finetti made the point in this way ([49], Section 11.2.2):

... the H appearing in $\mathbf{P}(E|H)$ means that this is the probability You attribute to E if ‘in addition to your present information ... *it will become known to You that H is true (and nothing else)*’. It would be wrong, therefore, to state, or to think, in a superficial manner, without at least making sure that these explanations are implicit, that $\mathbf{P}(E|H)$ is the probability of E once H is known. In general, by the time we learn that H has occurred, we will already have learnt of other circumstances which might also influence our judgement. In any case, the evidence which establishes that H has occurred will itself contain, explicitly or implicitly, a wealth of further detail, which will modify our final state of information, and, most likely, our probabilistic judgement.

in n trials:

$$\text{posterior probability that } a \leq p \leq b = \frac{\int_a^b p^y(1-p)^{n-y} dp}{\int_0^1 p^y(1-p)^{n-y} dp}. \quad (6)$$

Bayes's friend Richard Price, who published Bayes's essay after Bayes's death, explains in his introduction to the essay that Bayes had written this argument out but had feared that his readers would not find it convincing and had therefore used a different argument, which was bolstered by a scholium. This argument did not appeal to Bayes's fifth proposition.

The billiard table's two dimensions are not needed, and we can explain the argument more quickly in one dimension, as Morgan Crofton did in the article on probability in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* in 1885 [34]. The question "will not be altered" Crofton opined, if we suppose that whether the event happens or not on each trial is determined by whether a point chosen at random on a line segment falls to the left or the right of a particular unknown point. Suppose, for simplicity, that the segment is the unit interval $[0, 1]$; the event happens if the point falls to the left of p , fails if it falls to the right of p ; thus it happens each time with probability p . The point p itself is also chosen at random – i.e., from the uniform distribution on $[0, 1]$. So all we know of p is that it is the $(y + 1)$ st in order of $n + 1$ points chosen at random in A . The formula (6) follows. The fiducial judgement here the assumption that the random choice of the point p is independent of the statistical evidence y – independent of the random choices of the n other points on the line. This replaces the equally fiducial fifth proposition.

In his scholium, Bayes pointed out that y has $n + 1$ possible values, namely $0, 1, \dots, n$, and that his billiard table experiment, considered before any throws are made, gives equal probabilities to these $n + 1$ values. The reasonableness of this result, he contended, vindicated his method.

In his introduction, Price asserts that it was the uniform prior probabilities for p that Bayes feared might be unpersuasive.⁵¹ This uniform distribution is still present and hardly disguised, however, in the billiard-table argument. So it seems reasonable to ask if it might instead have been the fiducial argument for the fifth proposition that worried Bayes. Assumptions of independence were familiar and easily accepted even in Bayes's time, and so the assumption that p

⁵¹Price reported (page 371) that Bayes thought that he could solve the problem ...

... provided some rule could be found according to which we ought to estimate the chance that the probability for the happening of an event perfectly unknown, should lie between any two named degrees of probability, antecedently to any experiments made about it; and that it appeared to him that the rule must be to suppose the chance the same that it should lie between any two equidifferent degrees; which, if it were allowed, all the rest might be easily calculated in the common method of proceeding in the doctrine of chances. Accordingly, I find among his papers a very ingenious solution of this problem in this way. But he afterwards considered, that the *postulate* on which he had argued might not perhaps be looked upon by all as reasonable ...

was chosen independently of the other points might have seemed more persuasive.

The first person to explain the limitations of Bayes’s rule clearly may have been Antoine Augustin Cournot, in his 1843 book, *Exposition de la théorie des chances et des probabilités*. He summarized his analysis as follows:

Bayes’s rule . . . has no utility aside from leading to the fixing of bets under a certain hypothesis about what the arbiter knows and does not know. It leads to an unfair fixing if the arbiter knows more than we suppose about the real conditions of the random trial.⁵²

The fiducial principle allows us to say this in a more positive way: we should continue to trust the betting rate only if we make the judgement that other information, information other than B ’s happening and the information that went into fixing $P(B)$ and $P(A\&B)$, is irrelevant.

3.3 Dempster-Shafer belief functions

The arguments by Laplace, Bayes, and Crofton that we have just reviewed can all be placed within Dempster-Shafer theory and generalized in various ways. Dempster’s first article on the theory included a generalization of the Crofton argument in which we do not put prior probabilities on p and hence obtain only upper and lower posterior probabilities for it [52].⁵³ In [61], Dempster explained how the simple fiducial example discussed on page 10 above fits into Dempster-Shafer theory, where it generalizes to a treatment of the Kalman filter.

The central idea of Dempster-Shafer theory is what I call *Dempster’s rule of combination*. This rule tells us how to combine beliefs (upper and lower probabilities) based on independent bodies of evidence. Here (as in the case of Bayes’s billiard table), the word *independent* signals a fiducial judgement. We decide that each body of evidence does not materially change certain judgements based on the other body of evidence. As Dempster occasionally put the matter to me in the 1970s, we “continue to believe”. As I now prefer to say, we continue to trust that certain bets will not succeed spectacularly. Over the years, critics of Dempster-Shafer have pointed to examples where we do not want to make this judgement, but that there are such examples only confirms that the judgement is needed. Bayesian arguments are in the same boat.⁵⁴

⁵²My translation of a passage in Section 89. See [187] for additional translations from Cournot.

⁵³The structural equation G can be written in the form $G(u, p) = \text{happen if } u \leq p$ and $G(u, p) = \text{fail if } u > p$, where u is uniformly distributed on $[0, 1]$.

⁵⁴Here Dempster’s and my views have diverged. In 1968, Dempster observed that “the connection [between probability and betting] is so close that it is almost of the nature of a tautology to speak of one or of the other” ([57], page 244). He now emphasizes a logical conception of probability not based on betting, in the tradition of De Morgan, Boole, and Jevons [62, 208], whereas I now take a betting version of Cournot’s principle (see Section 5) as basic to the meaning of probability, and this is more Bernoullian than logical. And whereas Dempster now disavows phrases such as “continuing to believe”, I see continuing to trust (that a gambling strategy using given odds will not multiply one’s capital by a large factor) as the best way to express the judgement of independence or irrelevance needed for Dempster’s rule.

The fiducial principle is also at play in Dempster-Shafer and Bayesian analyses in financial auditing, intelligence, and other domains where little of the evidence we want to combine is statistical. In these cases, we construct belief functions or probability distributions by drawing an analogy between games of chance and other setups where numerical probabilities are strongly trusted and murkier situations to which we decide to extend that trust. See [178, 190].

3.4 Imprecise and game-theoretic probability

As I have noted (page!16), we can decide to continue to trust only certain probabilities rather an entire initial probability distribution. We do this when we “conditionalize” using the formula (5), for this amounts to continuing to trust certain conditional bets while no longer trusting the initial unconditional bets. The same move is involved (if renormalization is required) in the more general case of Dempster’s rule of combination. Generalized fiducial inference, discussed in Section 2.5, also involve this move.

If we anticipate that we might retain only some probabilities, it is reasonable to ask whether some of those that we will not retain can be identified at the outset and removed from the initial model, thus making this model simpler and perhaps more plausible as a representation of actual evidence. This may take us outside the Fisherian framework and into the realm of imprecise and game-theoretic probability [5, 191]. For an application of the fiducial idea to the theory of imprecise probability, see [189]. For a yet more general picture in which different probability judgements are trusted to different degrees, see [99].

The theories of imprecise probabilities and game-theoretic probability both begin with a betting interpretation of probability but differ in how they trust given odds. Following Walley [218], most authors working with imprecise probabilities adopt de Finetti’s view that subjective probabilities are dispositions to bet or otherwise act. In the game-theoretic picture [191], trust in a system of odds is interpreted as a judgement that these odds will resist gambling strategies: they will not allow you to multiply the capital you risk by a large factor. This is the game-theoretic version of Cournot’s principle (see Section 5 below).

4 Poisson’s principle

Siméon Denis Poisson (1781–1840) was Laplace’s successor as the leader of French mathematics [20]. We can trace back to his work in the 1830s the principle that probabilistic prediction is possible even when probabilities vary.⁵⁵

In 1835, Poisson enthusiastically announced what he saw as a great empirical discovery:

Things of every nature are subject to a universal law that we may call *the law of large numbers*. It consists in the fact that if you observe

⁵⁵And perhaps even farther back. See Chapter 9 of the second book of Laplace’s *Théorie analytique* [121].

very considerable numbers of events of the same nature, depending on causes that vary irregularly, sometimes in one direction and sometimes in another, without tending in any particular direction, you will find a nearly constant ratio between these numbers.⁵⁶

Poisson explained this empirical stability by generalizing Bernoulli's theorem. He showed that with high probability, counts and averages will be stable over time even if the probabilities and expected values vary.

Poisson's contemporaries found the complexity of his picture confusing. If there are probabilities for how the probabilities vary, then Bernoulli's theorem, applied to the mean probability, is theory enough.⁵⁷ But they took up his insight in various ways. In 1846, for example, the Russian mathematician Pafnuty Chebyshev (1821–1894) proved a generalization of Bernoulli's theorem in which the probabilities vary [25]. Many other generalizations followed.

4.1 Beyond the random sample

For simplicity, let us first consider the case where we consider the frequency of some event in successive trials (rather than the average of some variable quantity), but where the event's probability may change. We may suppose that the trials are tosses of a coin. Suppose there are n successive tosses. Set

$$x_n := \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if the } n\text{th toss comes up heads} \\ 0 & \text{if the } n\text{th toss comes up tails,} \end{cases}$$

so that $\sum_{i=1}^n x_i/n$ is the frequency of heads in the n tosses. Here are three successively more general versions of the law of large numbers, ϵ and δ being arbitrarily small positive numbers.

Version 1 (Bernoulli). Suppose the tosses are independent and the probability p of heads is the same each time. Then we can find a value of n sufficiently large that

$$\left| \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n x_i}{n} - p \right| \leq \epsilon \tag{7}$$

with probability at least $1 - \delta$.

Version 2 (Chebyshev). Suppose the tosses are independent and the probability of heads on the i th toss is p_i . Then we can find a value of n

⁵⁶[162], page 478, my translation. The original French: “Les choses de toute nature sont soumises à une loi universelle qu'on peut appeler *la loi des grandes nombres*. Elle consiste en ce que, si l'on observe des nombres très considérables d'événements d'un même nature, dépendants de causes qui varient irrégulièrement, tantôt dans un sens, tantôt dans l'autre, sans que leur variation soit progressive dans aucun sens déterminé, on trouvera, entre ces nombres, des rapports à peu près constants.”

⁵⁷See Stephen Stigler's summary on page 182–186 of [198]. Stigler regards I. J. Bienaymé as Poisson's most effective critic. See also [23, 108].

sufficiently large that

$$\left| \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n x_i}{n} - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i}{n} \right| \leq \epsilon. \quad (8)$$

with probability at least $1 - \delta$.

Version 3 (Lévy). Suppose P is a probability distribution for x_1, \dots, x_n . Then we can find a value of n sufficiently large that

$$P \left(\left| \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n x_i}{n} - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n E(x_i | x_1, \dots, x_{i-1})}{n} \right| \leq \epsilon \right) \geq 1 - \delta, \quad (9)$$

where $E(x_i | x_1, \dots, x_{i-1})$, the expected value under P of x_i given the values of x_1, \dots, x_{i-1} , is also the probability that $x_i = 1$ given x_1, \dots, x_{i-1} .

In each version, the conclusion of the theorem is that the frequency of heads will approximate, with very high probability, a probability or an average probability. In Version 1, the frequency approximates the probability p . In Versions 2 and 3, it approximates an average probability. Version 3, the martingale law of large numbers, began to emerge only with the work of the Russian mathematician Sergei Bernstein in the 1920s and was first clearly understood by the French mathematician Paul Lévy in the 1930s.⁵⁸ British and American mathematical statisticians began to think in terms of Versions 2 and 3 only beginning in the 1940s, as they more fully absorbed continental work on mathematical probability as a result of the influx of mathematicians fleeing Hitler.⁵⁹

4.2 Beyond frequencies

Bernoulli's, Chebyshev's and Lévy's laws of large numbers for coin tossing all generalize to the case where the random variables x_1, \dots, x_n are not necessarily binary but satisfy certain regularity conditions. The ratio $\sum_{i=1}^n x_i/n$ is then an average, not necessarily a frequency; p in (7) is x 's mean; p_i in (8) is x_i 's mean. The conditional expected value in (9) is no longer necessarily a conditional probability.

Poisson's principle, as I have formulated it, says that these laws of large numbers are predictions, even though they are not statements about frequencies. The prediction

$$\left| \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n x_i}{n} - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n E(x_i | x_1, \dots, x_{i-1})}{n} \right| \leq \epsilon \quad (10)$$

⁵⁸Lévy focused not on the martingale law of large numbers as stated here but on the corresponding central limit theorem, which approximates the probability in (9) using the normal distribution, thus strengthening the martingale law of large numbers just as just as De Moivre improved on Bernoulli's theorem. See [10, 131, 127].

⁵⁹Jerzy Neyman, Abraham Wald, and other immigrants to Britain and the United States were already changing the direction of statistics in the 1930s, but as Sandy Zabell has pointed out, it was only in the 1940s that probability, with the help of newcomers such as William Feller and Mark Kac, became a distinct and powerful branch of mathematics in the United States [228].

in (9), when the x_i are not binary, is a case in point. It does not equate a probability or even an average probability with a frequency.

Poisson’s principle is now a commonplace. Markov processes, martingales, time-series models, and a plethora of other stochastic processes have been major topics of statistical research for more than half a century. But our ways of talking have sometimes lagged behind, remaining in Fisher’s picture of a random sample from a hypothetical population. The persistence of the word *frequentist* is one example of this lag.

In 1960, in the *Journal of the American Statistical Association* [154], Jerzy Neyman announced that stochastic processes had superseded independent trials in all branches of science. He wrote:

The fourth period in the history of indeterminism, currently in full swing, the period of “dynamic indeterminism,” is characterized by the search for evolutionary chance mechanisms capable of explaining the various frequencies observed in the development of the phenomena studied. The chance mechanism of carcinogenesis and the chance mechanism behind the varying properties of the comets in the Solar System exemplify the subjects of dynamic indeterministic studies.

Here he was evidently using *frequencies* in a broad and even metaphorical way, to refer not merely to frequencies on repeated trials but to averages of various kinds.

The law of large numbers is further generalized game-theoretically in [191], from the setting where a probability distribution for the whole sequence of variables is offered at the outset to the case where possibly more limited bets are offered on x_i after x_1, \dots, x_{i-1} are announced. For example, you may be offered x_i at the price m_i . Assuming for example that the x_i and m_i are all uniformly bounded in absolute value, we can show that for n sufficiently large,

$$\bar{P} \left(\left| \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n x_i}{n} - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n m_i}{n} \right| \leq \epsilon \right) \leq 1 - \delta, \quad (11)$$

where $\bar{P}(A)$, the upper probability of an event A , is by definition the amount of money you must risk in order to get one monetary unit if A happens.

5 Cournot’s principle

To put Poisson’s principle to work, we must acknowledge how a probabilistic theory makes a prediction: it predicts an event by giving it very high probability. As Abraham Wald said in a lecture at Notre Dame in 1941 [216], probability theory can be applied to real phenomena by translating the theoretical statement “the event E has a probability near to one” into “it is practically certain that the event E will occur in a single trial.”

We did not need Wald to tell us this. As soon as we saw the probability statement (9), we understood that the stochastic process represented by P was

predicting the event (10). But this needs to be stated explicitly. Cournot did so, and he was the first to state that this is the *only* way that probability relates to phenomena [192, 183].

If we agree with Chuprov that Bernoullian statistics rests on Bernoulli's theorem and its generalizations, then we must also recognize that Cournot's principle is part of that foundation. Chuprov and his student Okcar Anderson called it *Cournot's bridge*, because it connects the probability statement (e.g., Bernoulli's theorem) to the event it predicts (e.g., the empirically observed law of large numbers) [144, 145]. It was the French mathematician Maurice Fréchet who first called this bridge *Cournot's principle* [192].

In addition to providing part of the foundation of Bernoullian statistics, Cournot's principle also helps bring Bernoullian and Bayesian statistics together, because most statisticians who call themselves Bayesian also believe in model checking. In the end, a Bayesian model is of little use in practice unless its predictions are consistent, in the large, with what we observe. For Bayesian testimony on this point, see George E. P. Box's classic defense of significance testing [16]. See also [91, 175, 188].

Most continental mathematicians who studied mathematical probability in the first half of the 20th century subscribed to Cournot's principle in one way or another. In addition to Wald, salient examples include Evgeny Slutsky, Paul Lévy, Emile Borel, Andrei Kolmogorov, Abraham Wald, and Trygve Haavelmo [144, 192, 183, 187]. Like Chuprov, these mathematicians saw Bernoulli's theorem and its generalizations as fundamental to probability, but they also saw that only one of the probabilities in Bernoulli's theorem is being approximately equated with a frequency. The probability p in (3) is equal for practical purposes to the frequency y/n , but the probability that p is within ϵ of y/n is not a frequency. As Cournot explained (see page 18 above), we can interpret it as a frequency if we want; we imagine that the whole experiment involving n trials is itself repeated many times. Again applying Bernoulli's theorem, we see that with very high probability the frequency with which $p - y/n \leq \epsilon$ happens in this imaginary superexperiment will be near one. But again we have an uninterpreted probability, and to give it a frequency interpretation we need a yet huger imaginary superexperiment. Here looms, in the words of R. A. Fisher, "a perpetual regression defining probabilities in terms of probabilities in terms of probabilities" ([86], page 266). We will have an uninterpreted probability forever unless we terminate the regression by applying Cournot's principle.

The continental mathematicians also saw that the law of large numbers is far from being the only prediction that can be checked in order to test a probabilistic hypothesis. Consider, for example, the law of the iterated logarithm, which concerns the rate at which a frequency will converge in repeated independent trials of an event [115]. This law is of little interest to statisticians, because the number of observations needed to test it is impossibly large, but there are related predictions that can be tested. One such prediction, emphasized by Jean Ville, is that the frequency will at least oscillate around the probability; it will not converge to it from above or from below [209].

5.1 Objections to the principle

Cournot’s principle is sometimes criticized for its vagueness. A probability close to one is a prediction, but how close to one? As Wald explained, such vagueness is always associated with the application of theory to real phenomena:

The purpose of statistics, like that of geometry or physics, is to describe certain real phenomena. The objects of the real world can never be described in such a complete and exact way that they could form the basis of an exact theory. We have to replace them by some idealized objects, defined explicitly or implicitly by a system of axioms. For instance, in geometry we define the basic notions “point,” “straight line,” and “plane” implicitly by a system of axioms. They take the place of empirical points, straight lines, and planes which are not capable of definition. In order to apply the theory to real phenomena, we need some rules for establishing the correspondence between the idealized objects of the theory and those of the real world. These rules will always be somewhat vague and can never form part of the theory itself.

On the other hand, we can give guidelines, depending on context and purpose. Emile Borel, who called Cournot’s principle “the only law of chance” [14], suggested that a probability of 10^{-6} is negligible on a human scale, a probability of 10^{-15} on a terrestrial scale, a probability of 10^{-50} on a cosmic scale, and a probability of 10^{-1000} on a universal scale ([13] pages 6–7).

Another common objection is that what happens always has small probability. A lottery always has a winning ticket. This overlooks the role of the statistician or scientist, who chooses the prediction in advance.⁶⁰ Injecting a scientist into the picture might seem to threaten the objectivity of the probability model, but in practice only a limited number of predictions are important [19, 215]. Even in theory we can only make a countable number of predictions, which could be combined into a single prediction were it computable [11].

Bruno de Finetti rejected Cournot’s principle.⁶¹ In a note to Maurice Fréchet in 1955 [48], he wrote as follows:⁶²

⁶⁰The condition that the criterion for testing a probabilistic theory be chosen in advance was emphasized by Cournot and Borel; see Cournot’s discussion of multiple testing translated in [187] and Borel’s discussion in his 1914 book, *Le Hasard* [12]. Neyman cited this discussion by Borel as an inspiration for the ideas in his work with E. S. Pearson on hypothesis testing [155, 128]. There is a difference, however, between choosing a rejection region in advance and choosing only a test statistic from which a p-value will be calculated. The game-theoretic framework of [191] provides straightforward ways to correct for the incompleteness of a test statistic as a specification of a test, and the correction is generally comparable to using a Bayesian significance test of Harold Jeffreys’s type [187].

⁶¹See page 221 of [44], Sections 5.2.3 and 5.10.9 of [49], and page 163 of [50].

⁶²My translation of the following passage in French on page 235:

La définition de la probabilité subjective est basée sur le comportement de celui qui l’évalue: elle consiste dans la mesure des sacrifices qu’il croit convenable d’accepter pour échapper au risque d’un dommage qui surviendrait avec l’événement considéré (taux d’assurance, de pari, etc.). En particulier, dire que

The definition of subjective probability is based on the behavior of the person who assesses it: it comes down to measuring the sacrifices the person thinks it reasonable to accept in order to escape from the risk of some harm that would accompany the event considered (insurance premium, betting rate, etc.). In particular, saying that the probability is small indicates that the person judges the risk to be negligible, that is to say, that he acts more or less as if the event were impossible. If this is not a principle, it is because it is by definition a synonym, a tautology, a banality.

This passage might give the impression that de Finetti would agree that a very small probability authorizes a prediction. But this he consistently denied. In his uncompromising subjective view, a probability is always a forecast, never a prediction.⁶³

5.2 The game-theoretic form of the principle

We predict using a probabilistic theory by singling out an event E to which it gives small probability and predicting that E will not happen. This is one of the simplest ways of stating Cournot's principle. We can make the statement more concrete by interpreting the theory's probability for E , say α , as an offer to bet. If we take the bet, betting α on E , and E does happen, then we will have turned the amount α we have risked into the amount 1; we will have multiplied the capital we risked by the large factor $1/\alpha$. So predicting that E will not happen is tantamount to predicting that we will not multiply our capital by a large factor.

The game-theoretic form of Cournot's principle can be stated in a somewhat more general and flexible form: *the objective content of a system of probabilities lies in the prediction that a strategy for betting at the corresponding odds will not multiply the capital risked by a large factor*. This coheres with the game-theoretic form of the fiducial principle, as stated on page 16: to use probabilities, we must decide to believe that no strategy we devise to bet at the corresponding odds will multiply the capital it risks by a large factor.

One advantage of the game-theoretic formulation is that it makes more salient the requirement that the event being predicted be selected in advance of observing whether it happens. No one will take a bet after the fact.

la probabilité est petite, signifie que l'on juge le risque comme négligeable, c'est-à-dire, que l'on agit à peu près comme si l'événement était impossible. Si cela n'est plus un principe, c'est qu'il est par définition un synonyme, une tautologie, une banalité.

⁶³In his later work, de Finetti systematically used the Italian *previsione*, which can be translated into French as *prévision* and into English as *forecast*, for the probabilistic concept of expected value. A probability, being the expected value of a zero-one variable, is also a *previsione*. De Finetti explains his distinction between *previsione* (forecast) and *predizione* (prediction) in [49], Sections 3.1.2 and 5.2.3. De Finetti's *previsione* was rendered as *prevision* in the English translation of [49], and this use in English has subsequently been adopted by several other authors, including Walley in his work on imprecise probabilities [218].

As noted on page 16, we can use the fiducial principle flexibly by deciding only to trust certain probabilities and only in certain situations. This flexibility is particularly salient and far-reaching when we use the game-theoretic formulation. Instead of predicting that no strategy for using given odds will multiply the capital risked by a large factor, we can make this prediction for a particular strategy or for some small class of particularly simple strategies.

The generalization from predicting the failure of particular events to predicting the futility of particular strategies is particularly consequential when we use Cournot's principle for testing. In this case, the choice of a particular event (or *critical region*, as it is called in the Neyman-Pearson theory of testing) also fixes the significance level α , which measures the strength of the test and hence the level of negative evidence if the test rejects. A gambling strategy, on the other hand, can measure the level of negative evidence more flexibly, by how large a factor the capital is multiplied. This measure has a legitimacy not shared by p-values. When we use p-values, we are specifying in advance a test statistic on which to bet, but we are not specifying the bet in advance. Moreover, idea of testing by a gambling strategy is applicable when we are dealing with a forecasting system, an actual forecaster, or a theory that produces only limited betting odds, perhaps sequentially with feedback, whereas the idea of testing by selecting an event of small probability requires that the theory or forecaster provide a comprehensive probability distribution in advance so that a critical region can be selected.

See Appendix B for additional information on the game-theoretic understanding of probability.

6 Conclusion

In practice, both Bernoullian and Bayesian statistics rely on fiducial judgements. Bernoullian statistics relies on judgements, made in particular cases, that predictions in which we are confident before certain observations still merit our confidence after. Bayesian statistics relies on similar judgements, applied to conditional predictions.

Poisson's principle clarifies the role of frequencies. Bernoullian and Bayesian analyses make predictions about averages and about other events, not merely about frequencies.

Cournot's principle tells us how a probabilistic analysis, Bernoullian or Bayesian, makes a prediction: it assigns the predicted event a probability close to one. This can be put in betting terms. The probability close to one implies very favorable odds for a bet against the event, odds that would multiply the capital you risk by a large factor if the event fails; the prediction is that the bet will not succeed.

The three principles unify probability while validating its diversity. They are used by fiducial, Dempster-Shafer, and imprecise-probability analyses just as they are used by Bernoullian and Bayesian analyses. This lends legitimacy to these less classical approaches and may open the way to even leaner paradigms

of probabilistic analysis and prediction. Bets we choose to trust may yield interesting predictions even if they are too sparse to define random points or random subsets or to satisfy the axioms of imprecise probability.

A Towards a history of the names *Bayesian*, *Bernoullian*, etc.

How did the names Bayesian, fiducial, and frequentist arise? What other names have been used for the Bayesian and Bernoullian schools of thought?

A.1 Bayesian

So far as we know, *Bayesian* has been used in English to refer to the work of Thomas Bayes only beginning in the middle of the 20th century. In the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th, we find only *Bayes's* or *Bayes'*, as in *Bayes's rule*, *Bayes's formula* and *Bayes's theorem*. We similarly see only the possessive form in French during this period: *règle de Bayes*, not *règle bayesienne*.

We do see the adjectival form very early in German. The German translation of Cournot's book on probability, which appeared in 1849, translated Cournot's *règle de Bayes* as *Bayes'sche Regel*. The adjective endured. Emmanuel Czuber used *Bayessche* in his history of probability ([35] 1900) and in the multiple editions of his authoritative probability textbook ([36] 1903). In the German edition of Andrei Markov's textbook, published in 1912 [141], we find both *Formel von Bayes* and *Bayesschen Formel*. In his book on the philosophy of probability ([37] 1923), Czuber applied the adjective *Bayessche* to the nouns *Theorem*, *Satz*, *Formel*, *Regel*, *Ansatz*, and *Schlussweise*.

This difference between German practice on the one hand and French and English on the other was not merely a matter of grammar or literary style. The English readily turned other prominent names into adjectives in the 19th century; witness *Newtonian*, *Kantian*, and *Laplacean*. The role of Laplace is surely the crux of the matter. He, rather than Bayes, developed the statistical methodology that we now call Bayesian, for Bayes studied only what we now call the binomial case. Yet it makes little sense to call the methodology Laplacean, for inverse probability was but one of the probability methods Laplace developed.⁶⁴ The English solved this problem by adopting the term *inverse probability*, which first appears in print in work by Augustus de Morgan in the 1830s, with reference both to Bayes's problem (finding an inverse or converse to Bernoulli's theorem)

⁶⁴The 19th century uses of *Laplacean* and *Laplacian* in English that I have found are in physics rather than in probability. Arne Fisher, in his 1915 book on probability [76], calls the normal probability curve *Laplacean*. In the preface to the second edition, in 1922, he refers to Laplace's Bernoullian work using the phrases "Laplacean methods" and "Laplacean doctrine of frequency curves".

and Bayes's and Laplace's solution of the problem [71].⁶⁵ The French, who became remarkably disinterested in and even hostile towards Laplace's work on probability during the second half of the 19th century [24, 146], continued to use Cournot's name *règle de Bayes* and similar phrases. The Germans, as we have noted, continued to use *Bayessche*; they were perhaps more interested in least squares than the French, but they preferred Gauss's Bernoullian justification for it to Laplace's justification by inverse probability [24].

The influx of German-speaking mathematicians into the United States and Britain before, during, and after World War II surely brought German ways of speaking with it. In any case, *Bayesian* begins to appear in print in English around 1950. The first appearance I have seen came in 1948, in an article by Charles P. Winsor, then working in biostatistics at Johns Hopkins [222]. Reviewing a discussion of binomial estimation that had taken place in the *Educational Times* in the 1880s, Winsor uses the phrases *Bayesian argument* and *Bayesian assumption*. The next appearance is in 1950, in prefaces R. A. Fisher wrote for two of his earlier papers [83].⁶⁶ In 1951, L. J. Savage writes of "modern, or unBayesian, statistical theory" [170].

As Stephen Fienberg has documented, the name *Bayesian* became standard in the 1950s [74]. Those who began using it then included I. J. Good, who had learned probability by reading Keynes and Ramsey in the 1930s (see the preface to [97]) and working with Turing in World War II, newly Bayesian statisticians such as Savage, and decision theorists in American business schools such as Harry V. Roberts and Robert Schlaifer. In 1958, Erich Lehmann, not a Bayesian, used the term *Bayesian derivation* in passing in an unpublished technical report [129]. By 1960, Roberts could write that "Bayesian statistics" was now a standard term ([166], page 26). By 1962, he could write about the sometimes-called "Bayesian revolution" ([167], page 202).

In the instances just cited, *Bayesian* was used as an adjective. Searches of Google Books, JSTOR, and similar databases do not turn up uses of *Bayesian* as a noun or uses of the noun *Bayesianism* before the 1960s. As I argued in Section 2.2, Bayesians and Bayesianism did not really exist until the middle of the 20th century. There was a debate starting at least in the middle of the 19th century, with Cournot, about the validity and scope of Bayes's rule, but hardly anyone contended that it provided a basis for all of mathematical statistics.

Counterparts for the newly coined English *Bayesian* and *Bayesianism* eventually came into use in other European languages. The first uses I have seen in Italian and French were by Bruno de Finetti; he used the adjective *bayesiano* in Italian in 1954 [46] and the adjective *bayésien* in French in 1955 [47]. The French adjective is now written more often as *bayésien*, in an attempt to better imitate the English pronunciation. The French noun *bayésienisme* came much later and is still rare. In German, the English noun *Bayesian* became *Bayesianer* and *Bayesianism* became *Bayesianismus*.

⁶⁵The French phrase *Méthode inverse des probabilités* appeared much earlier in unpublished teaching notes by Fourier; see [33].

⁶⁶In one preface, he wrote "Bayesian probabilities *a posteriori*" (page 1.2b), in another "Bayesian probability *a posteriori*" (page 22.527a).

A.2 Bernoullian

In this article I have used the adjective *Bernoullian* to refer in general to non-Bayesian methods of statistical testing and estimation that are now often called *frequentist*. This usage is not standard but has a reasonable pedigree, going back at least to Francis Edgeworth:⁶⁷

- Edgeworth used *Bernoullian* with this meaning in 1918, contrasting “the *direct* problem associated with the name of Bernoulli” with “the *inverse* problem associated with the name of Bayes” [69].
- Arthur Dempster advocated the usage in 1966 [52]. In 1968 [55], in a review of three volumes of collected papers by Neyman and Pearson, Dempster wrote

Neyman and Pearson rode roughshod over the elaborate but shaky logical structure of Fisher, and started a movement which pushed the Bernoullian approach to a high-water mark from which, I believe, it is now returning to a more normal equilibrium with the Bayesian view.

- Ian Hacking used the term several times in his 1990 book, *The Taming of Chance* [100]. Writing about Poisson’s interest in changes in the chance of conviction by a jury, he wrote (page 97):

Laplace had two ways in which to address such questions. One is Bernoullian, and attends to relative frequencies; the other is Bayesian, and is usually now interpreted in terms of degrees of belief. Laplace almost invited his readers not to notice the difference.

The adjective *Bernoullian* honors Jacob Bernoulli just as *Bayesian* honors Thomas Bayes, and in a parallel way. In both cases, the individual dealt only with the estimation of an individual probability, but their approach has grown into a vast methodology. Unlike *frequentist*, moreover, *Bernoullian* does not suggest a naive equation of probability with frequency.

In addition to *frequentist*, Bernoullian statistics has also been called *objectivist*, *orthodox*, *classical*, and *sampling-theory*. I turn now to these names.

Classical

Although Edgeworth’s use of *Bernoullian* in 1918 is notable, the need for such a name was widely felt only in the mid-twentieth century, when Bayes’s rule was first widely seen as a general methodology rather than a particular method. The need was first felt by the Bayesians, who needed a name for their opponents.

⁶⁷*Bernoullian* has also been used in reference to various other contributions by the Bernoullis. In probability theory, it has been used to refer to Daniel Bernoulli’s theory of utility and to various aspects of Jacob Bernoulli’s problem of estimating a probability from repeated trials.

Savage's *objectivistic* and the occasionally used *non-Bayesian* were awkward, and *modern*, used by Savage before he considered himself a Bayesian, would no longer do. The adjectives *orthodox* and *classical* were better suited to the occasion, and both were common in the 1950s and 1960s. It is easy to find authors who used both adjectives, and others as well:

- I. J. Good used *orthodox statistical theory* in his 1950 book, *Probability and the Weighing of Evidence* [94]. In a 1956 book review, he used *orthodox* and *classical* in the same paragraph ([95], page 389). In a 1958 article, he used *classical objectivistic statistics* [96]
- Edwards, Lindman, and Savage systematically contrasted *classical* with *Bayesian* statistics in their 1963 article [72].
- Denis V. Lindley used *classical statistics* in a 1964 article [134]. In the preface to a 1965 book [135], he used *orthodox statistics*.
- John W. Pratt, in a 1965 article entitled “Bayesian interpretation of standard inference statements” [164], explained that by “standard” he was referring to methods developed in the “orthodox”, “classical”, “objective”, “frequency” or “Neyman-Pearson” tradition or traditions.

What is *orthodox* or *classical* is of course very changeable; these adjectives often refer to whatever aspect of yesterday's practice the author wants to replace or extend. The vagaries of *classical statistics* in the 20th century are particularly striking.

- Since the 1920s, physicists have used *classical statistics* to refer to statistical predictions that have been corrected by quantum theory.
- The preface to a statistics textbook published in 1940 [160] contrasted *classical statistics* as developed by Karl Pearson and his school with newer techniques developed by R. A. Fisher.
- In 1943, Jacob Wolfowitz contrasted *classical statistics* with nonparametric methods [223]. Joseph L. Hodges and Erich Lehmann were still using *classical* in this way in 1961 [109].
- For many in the mid 20th century, the treatment of inverse probability by Bayes and Laplace was classical. In the chapter on confidence regions in his 1946 book [31], Harald Cramér wrote (page 507):

In the older literature of the subject, probability statements of this type were freely deduced by means of the famous *theorem of Bayes*, one of the typical problems treated in this way being the classical problem of *inverse probability* . . .

- Some authors in the 1950s and 1960s used *classical statistics* for methods that assumed random sampling, as opposed to newer methods for stochastic processes or time series. Examples include Geoffrey H. Jowett in 1956

and 1957 [112, 113], Donald A. Darling in 1958 [39], and John W. Tukey in 1961 [205].

- In 1953, M. A. Girshick used *classical statistics* to refer to Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing, contrasting it with the theory of making decisions under uncertainty [92].

Although Girshick came close, it seems reasonable to say that I. J. Good was the first to use *classical statistics* as a general name for Bernoullian as opposed to Bayesian methods. He did so repeatedly, beginning in the 1950s. Also influential was the use of the term by Robert Schlaifer and his Bayesian decision-theory group at the Harvard Business School. Arthur Dempster has mentioned to me that this group’s use of *classical* surprised him when he encountered it in the late 1950s; for Dempster as for Cramér, inverse probability was classical, and Neyman-Pearson theory was the innovation. In the chapter entitled “The Classical Theory of Testing Hypotheses” in his 1959 book, *Probability and Statistics for Business Decisions* [171], Schlaifer made his case for the terminology (page 607):

At least in the United States, the theory of these procedures . . . is now “classical” in the literal sense of the word: it is expounded in virtually every course on statistics and is adhered to by the great majority of practicing statisticians.

One remarkable aspect of this use of the name *classical statistics* is that some proponents of the methods being called classical eventually adopted the term. It was used, for example, by Lucien Le Cam in 1964 [126] and by Jaroslav Hájek in 1967 [103]. Stephen Fienberg and John Aldrich have speculated that this embrace was influenced by Neyman’s use of *classical probability* for the mathematics of probability that he had learned as a student in Poland. In Neyman’s view, confidence intervals used classical probability to accomplish what Fisher was trying to do with his nonclassical fiducial probability [151].

Erich Lehmann continued to use *classical statistics* in the 21st century. In the first sentence of his *Fisher, Neyman, and the Creation of Classical Statistics*, posthumously published in 2011 [130], he wrote

Classical statistical theory – hypothesis testing, estimation, and the design of experiments and sample surveys – is mainly the creation of two men: R. A. Fisher (1890–1962) and J. Neyman (1894–1981).

Frequentist

The thesis that probability should be equated with relative frequency was already being debated in the second half of the 19th century, but the word *frequentist* came into use much later. By all accounts, the word was first used in print by the Columbia University philosopher Ernest Nagel (1901–1985) in 1936 [148, 149]. Nagel used *frequentist* only as a noun; the Harvard University philosopher Donald Williams used it as an adjective and also used *frequentism*

in 1945 [220]. Nagel and Williams used *frequentist* and *frequentism* to refer to a view about the meaning of probability, not to a statistical methodology. Thus *frequentism* was synonymous for them with the already common term *frequency theory of probability*.

In the 1920s and 1930s, many mathematicians used *frequency theory* to refer more specifically to the framework of Richard von Mises, which specified conditions on a sequence under which probability might be identified with limiting frequency in the sequence [211]. This framework was cumbersome compared with the axiomatics advanced by Fréchet and Kolmogorov [117], and by the end of the 1930s mathematicians had decisively rejected it as a starting point for mathematical work [192].

The term *frequentist* was first used to refer to Bernoullian statistics only in 1949, by the statistician Maurice G. Kendall [114], and it was not widely used before the 1960s. Jerzy Neyman bears some responsibility for its subsequent popularity. As we have seen, he used *frequencies* to refer broadly to the regularities predicted by stochastic processes. In a philosophical article published in 1977 [155], he emphatically embraced the label *frequentist*.

In this paper, I have argued against continued use of *frequentism* to refer to Bernoullian statistics. It suggests a naive equation of probability with frequency that hardly does justice to the generations of mathematicians who have developed the topic. By using it, Bernoullian statisticians have persuaded many philosophers that their viewpoint is shallow and incoherent [102, 101].

Sampling-theory

The earliest use I have seen of *sampling theory* as a general name for Bernoullian statistics is by Denis V. Lindley, in a discussion paper published by the Royal Statistical Society in 1968 [136]. There Lindley uses “orthodox sampling theory description”, “classical sampling theory methods”, “sampling theory approach”, and simply “sampling theory”.

In an article published in 1971 [60], Arthur Dempster used similar language. He wrote (page 58):

I do not believe that either the Bayesian approach or the sampling distribution approach to unity is a total error, but I do find that subtle issues are involved which compromise parts of both schools, so that a mixed viewpoint becomes desirable. Specifically, one must reckon with the weaknesses of sampling distribution methods for estimation and of Bayesian methods for significance testing.

In 1972, in another discussion paper for the Society [139], Lindley and Adrian F. M. Smith used “orthodox, sampling-theory framework” and “sampling-theory school”. The response was strikingly different from the response to Lindley three years earlier, in that most of the discussants, some Bayesians and some not, followed his lead by using the same or similar variations on *sampling theory*. These included J. A. Nelder, David R. Cox, R. L. Plackett, A. P. Dawid, and

C. Chatfield. Even Oscar Kempthorne used “sampling-theory school”, though with the quotation marks.

Lindley continued to use the term in a number of later publications, including his well known 1975 article “The future of statistics: a Bayesian 21st century” [137] and in a number of later publications (e.g., [138]). Two other prominent statisticians whose repeated use of the term has attracted notice are George E. P. Box, who considered himself a Bayesian, and David R. Cox, who does not.

- Box contrasted the “sampling theory approach” to the Bayesian approach in his 1973 book with George C. Tiao, *Bayesian Inference in Statistical Analysis* [17]. In his well known 1980 discussion paper at the Royal Statistical Society ([16] 1980), Box also contrasted Bayesian theory with “sampling inference” and “sampling theory”, and again a number of discussants followed by using similar terms.
- In their 1974 textbook, *Theoretical Statistics* [30], Cox and David V. Hinkley described theirs as the “sampling theory approach to statistical inference”. This approach, they explained, follows the *repeated sampling principle* (page 45):

... statistical procedures are to be assessed by their behavior in hypothetical repetitions under the same conditions.

In his *Principles of Statistical Inference*, published in 2006 [29], Cox wrote (page 7):

There are two broad approaches, called *frequentist* and *Bayesian*, respectively, both with variants. Alternatively, the former approach may be said to be based on *sampling theory* and an older term for the latter is that it uses *inverse probability*.

In my view, *sampling-theory statistics* is even more misleading than *frequentism*, because it ties us so firmly to Fisher’s framework of independent, identically distributed observations. It suggests, and the repeated-sampling principle makes explicit, the doctrine that a stochastic process that runs only once can be understood only by imagining that it runs many times – a doctrine that we can recognize as fallacious once we understand Cournot’s principle. The resulting confusion extends beyond statistical work to fields in physics that use probability, including statistical mechanics [93], quantum mechanics [18], and cosmology [196].

A.3 Fiducial

At the beginning of his 1873 essay on determinism [147], James Clerk Maxwell wrote that “we need some fiducial point or standard of reference, by which we may ascertain the direction in which we are drifting.” Maxwell was alluding to the use of the adjective *fiducial* in surveying and astronomy, where it refers,

according to the Oxford English Dictionary, to a line or point, etc., assumed as a fixed basis of comparison.

Fisher was evidently also referencing this meaning of the word when he called the probabilities he constructed from a pivot fiducial. In his initial example, the fixed point was the 95th percentile of the cumulative distribution function of the pivot. By continuing to believe the 95% probability statement – by trusting it, we obtain a 95% probability bound on the parameter.

The analogy with a true fixed point is imperfect. What Fisher was taking as fixed is fixed only by a fiducial judgement. But he brought the word *fiducial* into statistics in a permanent way. Rather than leave it to designate merely a failed argument, I propose to use it in a wider way relevant to nearly every application of statistics.

B Game-theoretic probability

The game-theoretic framework for mathematical probability can be traced back to ideas advanced by Blaise Pascal in the 17th century. In their correspondence in 1654, Pascal and Pierre Fermat had competing methods for calculating how stakes should be divided when a competition is cut short before either player has won enough games to win the entire stakes. Fermat used combinatorial reasoning, of a kind that had been understood in Europe since the 13th century [6], whereas Pascal used backwards induction to study how the value of each player's position (or *expectation*) changes as games are won and lost. Fermat's reasoning used the notion of equally possibility chances, whereas Pascal's reasoning, especially as elaborated later by Christian Huygens, relied only on the players' agreement to play on even terms and hence seems to apply to games of skill just as well as to games of chance [193].

The classical definition of probability was based on Fermat's notion of equally possible cases: the probability of an event is the ratio of the number of favorable cases to the total number of cases. Pascal's approach, which begins instead with odds at which the players have agreed to bet, leads to a different definition of probability: the probability of an event is the amount you must risk in order to get one monetary unit if the event happens. The two definitions connect with phenomena in different ways: Fermat connects through the notion of "equally possible," though this may strike modern sensibilities as mysterious. Pascal needs some other connection, and the natural one is Cournot's principle: we assume that strategies for betting at the corresponding odds will not allow you to multiply the money you risk by a large factor.

Mathematical probability is developed starting with Pascal's game-theoretic definition in my 2001 book with Vovk [191] and in a series of subsequent papers by several different authors, many published and many posted at probabilityandfinance.com. Here are some highlights of this work:

1. Concrete versions of the classical limit theorems of probability (the law of large numbers, the central limit theorem, and the law of the iterated

logarithm) follow from applying Cournot's principle to relatively simple strategies [191].

2. Abstract versions of more abstract measure-theoretic results, beginning with Lévy's zero-one law, can be deduced from assumptions about available bets similar to the assumptions used in the theory of imprecise probabilities [213].
3. Simple gambling strategies can be used to adjust p-values to account for the fact that they fall short of tests with fixed significance levels [41].
4. Reasonable statistical tests can be represented as betting strategies, and by playing against these strategies a forecaster can make a series of forecasts that pass the tests, provided only that he is provided feedback [184]. This casts light on why adaptive or non-stationary forecasting is possible and casts doubt on the notion that it teaches us anything about the world.
5. In securities markets, the assumption that a speculator will not multiply capital risked by a large factor relative to a market index using certain simple strategies implies that the paths of security prices will look like (possibly time-distorted) geometric Brownian motion and that the market index will appreciate in proportion to its accumulated variance [214, 186]. This resolves the equity premium puzzle and explains why equity performance is related to apparent risk without making assumptions about investors' probabilities and utilities.

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