The Game-Theoretic Capital Asset Pricing Model

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Abstract

Using the game-theoretic framework for probability (as formulated in our 2001 book), we derive a capital asset pricing model from an efficient market hypothesis, with no assumptions about the beliefs or preferences of investors. Our efficient market hypothesis says that a speculator with limited means cannot beat a particular index by a substantial factor. The model we derive says that the difference between the average returns of a portfolio and the index should approximate, with high lower probability, the difference between the portfolio’s covariance with the index and the index’s variance. This leads to interesting new ways to evaluate the past performance of portfolios and funds.

The journal version of this article has been published in International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 49 175–197 (2008). For continuous-time versions of its results, see [8] (based on non-standard analysis), [9], and [10]; these versions are simpler but less informative than the discrete-time results of this article.
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The established general theory of capital asset pricing combines stochastic models for asset returns with economic ideas, especially marginal utilities for current and future consumption [1, 3]. Twenty years of work have demonstrated the power and flexibility of the combination; many different stochastic models and many different models for investors’ marginal utility have been introduced and used. There is little consensus, however, concerning the empirical validity of these different instantiations of the theory.

In this article, we take a more parsimonious approach to capital asset pricing, using the game-theoretic framework advanced in [6]. In its simplest form, this framework uses a two-player perfect-information sequential game. In each round, Player I can buy uncertain payoffs at given prices, and then Player II determines the values of the payoffs. The game, a precise and purely mathematical object, is connected to the world by an auxiliary nonmathematical hypothesis, Cournot’s principle. Cournot’s principle says that if Player I avoids risking bankruptcy, then he cannot multiply his initial capital in the game by a large factor. This principle gives empirical meaning to the game-theoretic forms of the classical limit theorems of probability, which say that certain approximations or limits hold unless Player I is allowed to become very rich.

Upper and lower probabilities arise naturally and play an important role in the game-theoretic framework. The prices offered to Player I at the beginning of a round may fall short of determining probabilities for Player II’s move, but they always determine upper and lower probabilities. Markov’s inequality of probability theory says that a gambler’s chance of multiplying the amount he risks by $1/\alpha$ is never more than $\alpha$, so that when a strategy guarantees multiplying one’s capital by $1/\alpha$ provided an event $A$ happens, the probability of $A$ must be $\alpha$ or less. The intuition associated with Markov’s inequality is available even when there are no probabilities in our picture, and it leads us to define the upper probability $P_A$ for a set $A$ of possible values for Player II’s move as the reciprocal of the greatest factor by which Player I can be sure of multiplying his capital without risking bankruptcy if $A$ happens ([6], p. 187). Lower probabilities are then defined by $P_A = 1 - P_{A^c}$, where $A^c$ is the complement of $A$. When enough payoffs are priced to determine a probability for $A$, $P_A$ and $P_{A^c}$ both equal this probability ([6], p. 181). The same principles lead to upper and lower probabilities for the whole sequence of Player II’s moves if prices for all rounds are specified in advance. If prices are given by a player in the game as the game proceeds, we obtain upper and lower joint probabilities for the prices and Player II’s moves ([6], p. 70).

A financial market provides a game of the required form: Player I is a speculator, who may buy various securities at set prices at the beginning of each trading period, and Player II is the market, which determines the securities’ returns at the end of the period. If we measure Player I’s capital relative to a particular market index, then Cournot’s principle becomes an efficient market hypothesis: Player I cannot beat the index by a large factor while avoiding risk of bankruptcy. In this article, we show that this efficient market hypothesis gives a high lower probability to an approximate relation between an investor’s actual returns and the index’s actual returns (Eq. 6 in Section 1.4) that resembles...
the equation for the security market line (an exact relation between theoretical quantities) in the classical Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing model \[7, 5, 4\]. Because of the resemblance, we call our model the game-theoretic CAPM.

While not contradicting the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM, the game-theoretic CAPM differs from it radically in spirit. To avoid confusion, we need to keep three important aspects of the difference in view:

1. We make no assumptions whatsoever about the preferences or beliefs of investors.

2. We do not assume that asset returns are determined by a stochastic process. These returns are determined by the market, a player in our game. The market may act as it pleases, except that our efficient market hypothesis predicts it will not allow spectacular success for any particular investment strategy that does not risk bankruptcy.

3. The predictions of our model concern the relation between the actual returns of an investor (or the actual returns of a security or portfolio) and the actual returns of an index. These predictions are precise enough to be confirmed or falsified by the actual returns, without any further modeling assumptions.

In this article, we check the predictions for several securities, and we find that they are usually correct.

The empirical success of our predictions, though modest, constitutes a challenge to the established theory. In spite of its parsimony, the game-theoretic CAPM can make reasonably precise and reasonably correct predictions concerning the relation between average return and empirical volatility and covariance. Can the established theory deliver enough more to give credibility to its much stronger assumptions?

Our results can also be seen as a clarification of the roles of investors and speculators. An investor balances risk and return in an effort to balance present and future consumption, while a speculator is intent on beating the market. The established theory emphasizes the role of investors, but the efficient market hypothesis is usually justified by the presumed effectiveness of speculators. Speculators have already put so much effort into beating the market, the argument goes, that no opportunities remain for a new speculator who has no private information. The classical CAPM, still the most widely used instantiation of the established theory, bases its security market line, a relationship between expected return and covariance with the market, on the investor’s effort to balance return with volatility, perceived as a measure of risk. Our game-theoretic CAPM, in contrast, shows that this relationship between return and covariance arises already from the speculator’s elimination of opportunities to beat the market. So the relationship by itself does not provide any evidence that volatility measures risk, that it is perceived by the investor as doing so, or even that it can be predicted by the investor in advance.

In addition to providing an alternative understanding of the security market line, our results also lead to something entirely new: a new way of evaluating
the past performance of portfolios and investors. According to our theory, the
underperformance of a portfolio relative to the market index should be approxi-
mated by one-half the empirical variance of the difference between the return for
the portfolio and the return for the index. We call this quantity the theoretical
performance deficit (see Eq. (8)). In the case of an investor or fund whose strat-
egy cannot be sold short because it is not public information, the theoretical
performance deficit should be a lower bound on the underperformance. Because
a variance can be decomposed in many ways, the identification of the theoretical
performance deficit opens the door to a plethora of new ways to analyze
underperformance.

Because the game-theoretic apparatus in which our formal mathematical
results are stated will be unfamiliar to most readers, and because these results
include necessarily messy bounds on the errors in our approximations, we devote
most of this article to informal statements and explanations. We state our
results informally in Section 1 and we explain the geometric intuition underlying
them in Section 2. We introduce our game-theoretic framework only in Section 3.
We state our results precisely in that framework in Section 4, illustrate how they
can be applied to data in Section 5, and summarize their potential importance in
Section 6. Appendix A provides more information about game-theoretic upper
and lower probability, and Appendix B provides proofs of the propositions stated
in Section 4.

For brevity, we avoid using upper and lower probabilities explicitly in the
propositions stated in Section 4. Instead we express the inequality $P(A) \geq 1 - \alpha$
(or $P(A^c) \leq \alpha$) by saying that “$A$ is predicted at level $\alpha$.” But we do use lower
probability in one of the proofs in Appendix B because this allows us to use a
simple result from [6].

1 An Informal First Look

In this section we state the game-theoretic CAPM informally, say a few words
about its derivation and its resemblance to the classical CAPM, and then explain
how it leads to the theoretical performance deficit.

1.1 Average Return and Covariance

Consider a particular financial market and a particular market index $m$ in which
investors and speculators can trade. We assume that a speculator with limited
means cannot beat the performance of $m$ by a substantial factor; this is our
efficient market hypothesis for $m$.

The game-theoretic CAPM for $m$, which follows from this hypothesis, says
that if $s$ is a security (or portfolio or other trading strategy) that can be sold
short, then its average simple return, say $\mu_s$, is approximated by

$$\mu_s \approx \mu_m - \sigma_m^2 + \sigma_{sm},$$

(1)
where \( \mu_m \) is the average simple return for the index \( m \), \( \sigma^2_m \) is the uncentered empirical variance of \( m \)’s simple returns, and \( \sigma_{sm} \) is the uncentered empirical covariance of \( s \)'s and \( m \)'s simple returns. In order to make (1) into a mathematically precise statement, we must, of course, spell out just how close together \( \mu_s \) and \( \mu_m - \sigma^2_m + \sigma_{sm} \) will be. We do this in Proposition 3.

If \( s \) cannot be sold short, then we obtain only

\[ \mu_s \leq \mu_m - \sigma^2_m + \sigma_{sm}. \]  

(2)

This approximate inequality is made precise by Proposition 1. We call (1) the long-short game-theoretic CAPM, and we also call (2) the long game-theoretic CAPM.

We can also write (1) in the form

\[ \mu_s \approx (\mu_m - \sigma^2_m) + \sigma^2_m \beta_s, \]  

(3)

where \( \beta_s \) represents the ratio \( \sigma_{sm}/\sigma^2_m \). We call the line \( \mu = (\mu_m - \sigma^2_m) + \sigma^2_m \beta \) in the \((\beta, \mu)\)-plane the security market line for the game-theoretic CAPM. We call \( \beta_s \) the sensitivity of \( s \) to \( m \); it is the slope of the empirical regression through the origin of \( s \)'s returns on \( m \)'s returns.

1.2 The Empirical Nature of the Model

All the quantities in (1) are empirical: we are considering \( N \) trading periods, during which \( s \) has returns \( s_1, \ldots, s_N \) and \( m \) has returns \( m_1, \ldots, m_N \), and we have set

\[ \mu_s := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} s_n, \quad \mu_m := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} m_n, \quad \sigma^2_m := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} m_n^2, \quad \sigma_{sm} := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} s_n m_n. \]  

(4)

The \( s_n \) and \( m_n \) are simple returns; \( s_n \) is the total gain or loss (capital gain or loss plus dividends and redistributions) during period \( n \) from investing one monetary unit in \( s \) at the beginning of that period, and \( m_n \) is similarly the total gain or loss for \( m \).

Our theory does not posit the existence of theoretical quantities that are estimated by the empirical quantities \( \mu_s, \mu_m, \sigma^2_m, \) and \( \sigma_{sm} \), and there is nothing in our theory that requires these empirical quantities to be predictable in advance or stable over time.

Mathematical convenience in the development of our theory dictates that we use the uncentered definitions in (4) for \( \sigma^2_m \) and \( \sigma_{sm} \), so that \( \beta_s \) is the slope of the empirical linear regression through the origin. Numerically, however, we can expect (3) to remain valid if we use the centered counterparts of \( \sigma^2_m \) and \( \sigma_{sm} \), so that \( \beta_s \) is the slope of the usual empirical linear regression with a constant term, because there is usually little numerical difference between uncentered and centered empirical moments in the case of returns. The uncentered empirical
variance $\sigma_m^2$ is related to its centered counterpart, $\frac{1}{N} \sum_n (m_n - \mu_m)^2$, by the identity
\[
\frac{1}{N} \sum_n (m_n - \mu_m)^2 = \sigma_m^2 - \mu_m^2.
\]
Because $\mu_m$ is usually of the same order of magnitude as $\sigma_m^2$ (see Section 5), and because both are usually small, $\mu_m^2$ will usually be much smaller and hence negligible compared to $\sigma_m^2$. Similarly,
\[
\frac{1}{N} \sum_n (s_n - \mu_s)(m_n - \mu_m) = \sigma_{sm} - \mu_s \mu_m,
\]
and $\mu_s \mu_m$ will also be negligible compared to $\sigma_{sm}^2$. So a shift to the centered quantities will also make little difference in the ratio $\sigma_{sm}/\sigma_m^2$.

1.3 Why?

Proofs of Propositions 1 and 3 are provided in Appendix A, and the geometric intuition underlying them is explained in Section 2. It may be helpful, however, to say a word here about the main idea.

Our starting point is the fact that the growth of an investment in $s$ is best gauged not by its simple returns $s_n$ but by its logarithmic returns $\ln(1 + s_n)$ (see, e.g., [2], p. 11). If we invest one unit in $s$ at the beginning of the $N$ periods, reinvest all dividends as we proceed, and write $W_s$ for the resulting wealth at the end of $N$ periods, then
\[
\frac{1}{N} \ln W_s = \frac{1}{N} \ln \prod_{n=1}^N (1 + s_n) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N \ln(1 + s_n).
\]
So the Taylor expansion $\ln(1 + x) \approx x - \frac{1}{2} x^2$ yields
\[
\frac{1}{N} \ln W_s \approx \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N \left( s_n - \frac{1}{2} s_n^2 \right) = \mu_s - \frac{1}{2} \sigma_s^2.
\]
We call $\frac{1}{N} \ln W \approx \mu - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2$ the fundamental approximation of asset pricing. It shows us that investors and speculators should be concerned with volatility even if volatility does not measure risk, for volatility diminishes the final wealth that one might expect from a given average simple return. Moreover, it establishes approximate indifference curves in the $(\sigma, \mu)$-plane for a speculator who is concerned only with final wealth. As we explain in Subsections 2.2 and 2.4, we can reason about these indifference curves in much the same way as the classical CAPM reasons about an investor’s mean-variance indifference curves (see, e.g., [4], pp. 195–198), with similar results.

The imprecision of the approximations (1) and (2) arises partly from the imprecision of the fundamental approximation and partly from the imprecision of our efficient market hypothesis. We assume only that the market cannot be beat by a substantial factor, not that it cannot be beat at all.
1.4 Resemblance to the Classical CAPM

If we set \( \mu_f := \mu_m - \sigma_m^2 \), then we can rewrite (1) in the form

\[
\mu_s \approx \mu_f + (\mu_m - \mu_f) \frac{\sigma_{sm}}{\sigma_m^2}.
\]  

(6)

This resembles the classical CAPM, which can be written as

\[
E(\tilde{R}_s) = R_f + (E(\tilde{R}_m) - R_f) \frac{\text{Cov}(\tilde{R}_s, \tilde{R}_m)}{\text{Var}(\tilde{R}_m)},
\]  

(7)

where \( R_f \) is the risk-free rate of return, and \( \tilde{R}_s \) and \( \tilde{R}_m \) are random variables whose realizations are the simple returns \( s_n \) and \( m_n \), respectively (see [4], Eq. (7.9) on p. 197). But it differs from the classical CAPM in three ways:

1. It replaces theoretical expected values, variances, and covariances with empirical quantities. (The game-theoretic model has no probability measure and therefore no such theoretical quantities.)

2. It replaces an exact equation between theoretical quantities with an approximate equation between empirical quantities, with a precise error bound derived from the fundamental approximation and an efficient market hypothesis.

3. It replaces the risk-free rate of return with \( \mu_m - \sigma_m^2 \).

The two equations also differ fundamentally in what they can claim to accomplish. Because the left-hand side of the classical equation, Eq. (7), is the expected value of \( s \)'s future return, we might imagine an investor using this equation to predict \( s \)'s future price. This is a fantasy, because the theoretical expected value, variance, and covariance on the right hand side of the equation are not known to the investor (one could question whether they even exist in any useful sense), but this fantasy motivates some of the interest in the equation; it may even be responsible for the name “capital asset pricing model”. In contrast, Eq. (6) clearly does not predict individual prices. It predicts only how \( s \)'s price changes over time will be related, on average, to those for the market. It tells how the average of \( s \)'s returns will be related to their empirical covariance with returns on the market.

1.5 The Theoretical Performance Deficit

If we write \( W_m \) for the final wealth resulting from an initial investment of one unit in the index \( m \) and \( W_s \) for the final wealth of a particular investor who also begins with one unit capital, then

\[
\frac{1}{N} \ln W_m - \frac{1}{N} \ln W_s \overset{\text{FA}}{\approx} \left( \mu_m - \frac{1}{2} \sigma_m^2 \right) - \left( \mu_s - \frac{1}{2} \sigma_s^2 \right)
\]
\[
\text{CAPM} \approx \frac{1}{2} \sigma_s^2 - \sigma_{sm} + \frac{1}{2} \sigma_m^2 = \frac{1}{2} \sigma_{s-m}^2.
\]

Here FA indicates use of the fundamental approximation, \( \frac{1}{N} \ln W \approx \mu - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \), and CAPM indicates use of the game-theoretic CAPM, \( \mu_s - \mu_m \approx \sigma_{sm} - \sigma_m^2 \).

The final step uses the identity \( \sigma_{s-m}^2 = \sigma_s^2 - 2\sigma_{sm} + \sigma_m^2 \), where \( s - m \) is the vector of differences in the returns: \( s - m = (s_1 - m_1, \ldots, s_N - m_N) \).

So when an investor holds a fixed portfolio or follows some other strategy that can be sold short, we should expect

\[
\frac{1}{N} \ln W_m - \frac{1}{N} \ln W_s \approx \frac{1}{2} \sigma_{s-m}^2,
\]

and even when \( s \) cannot be sold short, we should expect

\[
\frac{1}{N} \ln W_m - \frac{1}{N} \ln W_s \geq \frac{1}{2} \sigma_{s-m}^2.
\]

In words: \( s \)'s average logarithmic return can be expected to fall short of \( m \)'s by approximately \( \frac{1}{2} \sigma_{s-m}^2 \), or by even more if there are difficulties in short selling. The approximation (8) is made precise by Proposition 4, and the approximate inequality (9) is made precise by Proposition 2.

We call \( \sigma_{s-m}^2 / 2 \) the \textit{theoretical performance deficit} for \( s \). If we consider the market index \( m \) a maximally diversified portfolio, then \( s \)'s theoretical performance deficit can be attributed to insufficient diversification.

It is natural to decompose the vector of simple returns \( s \) into a part in the direction of the vector \( m \) and a part orthogonal to \( m \): \( s = \beta_s m + e \). Then we have \( s - m = (\beta_s - 1)m + e \), and

\[
\sigma_{s-m}^2 = (\beta_s - 1)^2 \sigma_m^2 + \sigma_e^2.
\]

Thus \( s \)'s theoretical performance deficit, \( \sigma_{s-m}^2 / 2 \), decomposes into two parts:

- deficit due to nonunit sensitivity to \( m \): \( \frac{1}{2} (\beta_s - 1)^2 \sigma_m^2 \), \hspace{1cm} (10)
- deficit due to volatility orthogonal to \( m \): \( \frac{1}{2} \sigma_e^2 \). \hspace{1cm} (11)

These two parts of the deficit represent two aspects of insufficient diversification. Many other decompositions of \( \sigma_{s-m}^2 / 2 \) are possible, corresponding to events inside and outside the market. Such decompositions may be useful for analyzing and comparing the performance of different mutual funds, especially funds that do try to track the market.

There is nothing in our theory that would require the theoretical performance deficit of a particular security or portfolio to persist from one period of time to another. On the contrary, a persistence that is too predictable and substantial would give a speculator an opportunity to beat the market by shorting that security or portfolio, thus contradicting our efficient market hypothesis. But in the case of an investor or fund whose strategy cannot be shorted because it is not public information, persistence of the theoretical performance deficit or certain components of that deficit cannot be ruled out. It would be interesting to study the extent to which such persistence occurs.
2 The Geometric Intuition

In this section, we explain the geometric intuition that underlies the game-theoretic CAPM. This explanation will be repeated in a terser and more formal way in the proofs in Appendix B.

We begin with what we call the capital market parabola for \( m \): the curve in the \((\sigma, \mu)\)-plane consisting of all volatility-return pairs that yield approximately the same final wealth as \( m \). The efficient market hypothesis for \( m \) says that the volatility-return pair for the simple returns \( s \) achieved by any given investor should fall under the capital market parabola for \( m \), as should the volatility-return pair for any particular mixture of \( m \) and \( s \). In order for this to be true for mixtures that contain mostly \( m \) and only a little \( s \), the trajectory traced by the volatility-return pair as \( s \)'s share in the mixture approaches zero must be approximately tangent to the parabola. The formula that expresses this conclusion is our CAPM:

\[
\mu_s \approx \mu_m - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_m + \sigma_m s.
\]

The conclusion requires that short selling of \( s \) be possible, so that the mixture can include a negative amount of \( s \); otherwise we can conclude only that the trajectory cannot approach the parabola from above, and this yields only \( \mu_s \leq \mu_m - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_m + \sigma_m s \).

There are two sources of inexactness. First, the capital market parabola is only approximately an indifference curve for total wealth; this is the fundamental approximation. Second, the efficient market hypothesis for \( m \) is itself only approximately correct.

2.1 The Capital Market Parabola

As we saw in Subsection 1.3, a speculator who is concerned only with his final wealth will be roughly indifferent between volatility-return pairs that have the same value of \( \mu - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \)—i.e., volatility-return pairs that lie on the same parabola \( \mu = \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 + c \). Fig. 1 depicts two parabolas of this form in the half-plane consisting of \((\sigma, \mu)\) with \( \sigma > 0 \). The parabola that lies higher in the figure corresponds to a higher level of final wealth.

The efficient market hypothesis for the market index \( m \) implies that the volatility-return pair achieved by a particular investor should lie approximately on or below the final wealth parabola on which \((\sigma_m, \mu_m)\) lies. This is the parabola

\[
\mu = \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 + \left( \mu_m - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_m \right),
\]

the capital market parabola (CMP) for \( m \).

In general, the parabola that goes through the volatility-return pair for a particular security or portfolio \( s \),

\[
\mu = \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 + \left( \mu_s - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_s \right),
\]

intersects the \( \mu \)-axis at \( \mu_s - \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_s \). Because this is the constant simple return that gives approximately the same final wealth as \( s \), we call it \( s \)'s volatility-free equivalent.
Figure 1: **Indifference curves in the \((\sigma, \mu)\)-plane.** Each curve is a parabola of the form \(\mu = \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 + c\) for some constant \(c\). A speculator who is concerned only with final wealth will be approximately indifferent between two portfolios whose volatility-return pairs lie on the same such parabola. This figure also illustrates two additional points: (1) The indifference curve on which the market index \(m\) lies is called the *capital market parabola (CMP)*. (2) Because the minimum uncentered volatility \(\sigma\) compatible with a positive average return \(\mu\) is \(\mu\), the line \(\mu = \sigma\) represents the left-most boundary of the indifference curves in the positive quadrant. This line appears almost vertical because \(\mu\) and \(\sigma\) are measured on very different scales; for a typical pair \((\sigma, \mu)\), \(\sigma^2\) and \(\mu\) are of the same order of magnitude, and so \(\sigma\) is much larger than \(\mu\).
Figure 2: Mixing $m$ with an underperforming portfolio $s$. The curve joining $(\sigma_m, \mu_m)$ and $(\sigma_s, \mu_s)$ is the trajectory traced by the volatility-return pair for the portfolio $\epsilon s + (1 - \epsilon)m$ as $\epsilon$ varies from 0 to 1.

Strictly speaking, a constant simple return $\mu$ does not have zero volatility when we use the uncentered definition; its volatility is

$$\sigma := \sqrt{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} \mu^2} = |\mu|.$$  

This is why the indifference curves in Fig. 1 do not quite reach the $\mu$-axis; they stop at the line $\mu = \sigma$ above the $\sigma$-axis and at the line $\mu = -\sigma$ below the $\sigma$-axis. But the height of parabola 12’s intersection with this line will be practically the same as the height of its intersection with the $\mu$-axis.

### 2.2 Mixing $s$ and $m$: The Long CAPM

Suppose the speculator maintains a portfolio $p$ that mixes $s$ and $m$, say $\epsilon$ of $s$ and $(1 - \epsilon)$ of $m$, where $0 \leq \epsilon \leq 1$. (He rebalances at the beginning of every period so that $s$ always accounts for the fraction $\epsilon$ of $p$’s capital.) Under our efficient market hypothesis, the volatility-return pair for $p$ lies approximately on or below the CMP no matter what the value of $\epsilon$ is. As $\epsilon$ varies between 0 and 1, $(\sigma_p, \mu_p)$ traces a trajectory, perhaps as indicated in Fig. 2. We have

$$\mu_p = \epsilon \mu_s + (1 - \epsilon)\mu_m \quad (13)$$

and

$$\sigma_p = \sqrt{\epsilon^2 \sigma_s^2 + 2\epsilon(1 - \epsilon)\sigma_{sm} + (1 - \epsilon)^2 \sigma_m^2}. \quad (14)$$
Hence \( \frac{\partial \mu_s}{\partial \epsilon} \bigg|_{\epsilon=0} = \mu_s - \mu_m \) and \( \frac{\partial \sigma}{\partial \epsilon} \bigg|_{\epsilon=0} = \frac{\sigma_{sm} - \sigma_m^2}{\sigma_m} \). (Cf. [4], p. 197.) If the second of these two derivatives is nonzero, then their ratio,

\[
\frac{\mu_s - \mu_m}{(\sigma_{sm} - \sigma_m^2)/\sigma_m},
\]

is the slope of the tangent to the trajectory at \((\sigma_m, \mu_m)\).

Our goal here is to give a preliminary informal proof of the long CAPM—i.e., to understand why

\[
\mu_s - \mu_m \leq \sigma_{sm} - \sigma_m^2
\]

should hold approximately. To this end, we consider four cases:

1. \( \mu_s - \mu_m \leq 0 \) and \( \sigma_{sm} - \sigma_m^2 \geq 0 \);
2. \( \mu_s - \mu_m \geq 0 \) and \( \sigma_{sm} - \sigma_m^2 \leq 0 \), but not both are equal to 0;
3. \( \mu_s - \mu_m > 0 \) and \( \sigma_{sm} - \sigma_m^2 > 0 \);
4. \( \mu_s - \mu_m < 0 \) and \( \sigma_{sm} - \sigma_m^2 < 0 \).

Any two real numbers are related to each other in one of these four ways.

In Case 1, we obtain (16) immediately: a nonpositive quantity cannot exceed a nonnegative one. Fig. 2 is an example of this case. We see from the figure that \( \mu_s \) is below \( \mu_m \), and that the trajectory approaches \((\sigma_m, \mu_m)\) from the southeast. So \( \mu_s - \mu_m \) is strictly negative and the slope (15) is negative; it follows that \( \sigma_{sm} - \sigma_m^2 \) is positive.

Case 2 is ruled out by the efficient market hypothesis for \( m \). It tells us that \( \mu_s \) is at least as large as \( \mu_m \), and because \( \mu_p \) changes monotonically with \( \epsilon \), this means that the trajectory must approach \((\sigma_m, \mu_m)\) from above or the side. It also tells us that the slope (15) is negative unless one of the quantities is zero. So the trajectory approaches \((\sigma_m, \mu_m)\) from the northwest (directly from the west if \( \mu_s - \mu_m = 0 \), directly from the north if \( \sigma_{sm} - \sigma_m^2 = 0 \)). This means approaching \((\sigma_m, \mu_m)\) from above the CMP, in contradiction to our efficient market hypothesis.

In Case 3, the slope of the trajectory at \((\sigma_m, \mu_m)\) is positive, and the trajectory approaches \((\sigma_m, \mu_m)\) from the northeast. Because the trajectory must lie under the CMP, its slope at \((\sigma_m, \mu_m)\) cannot exceed the CMP’s slope at \((\sigma_m, \mu_m)\), which is \( \sigma_m \):

\[
\frac{\mu_s - \mu_m}{(\sigma_{sm} - \sigma_m^2)/\sigma_m} \leq \sigma_m.
\]

Multiplying both sides by the denominator, we obtain (16).

Case 4 is similar to Case 3; the slope is again positive, but now the approach is from the southwest, and so staying under the CMP requires that the slope be at least as great:

\[
\frac{\mu_s - \mu_m}{(\sigma_{sm} - \sigma_m^2)/\sigma_m} \geq \sigma_m.
\]

This time the denominator is negative, and so multiplying both sides by it again yields (16).
2.3 The Capital Market Line

We should pause to note that the approximate inequality that we have just argued for,

$$\mu_s \lesssim \mu_m - \sigma_m^2 + \sigma_{sm}, \tag{17}$$

implies a strengthening of the statement that $(\sigma_s, \mu_s)$ should be approximately on or below the capital market parabola in the $(\sigma, \mu)$-plane. This pair should also be approximately on or below the line tangent to this parabola at $(\sigma_m, \mu_m)$. (See Fig. 3.)

To see this, it suffices to rewrite (17) in the form

$$\mu_s \lesssim \mu_m - \sigma_m^2 + \rho_{sm} \sigma_m \sigma_s, \tag{18}$$

where $\rho_{sm}$ is the uncentered correlation coefficient between $s$ and $m$. Because $\rho_{sm} \leq 1$, this implies

$$\mu_s \lesssim \mu_m - \sigma_m^2 + \sigma_m \sigma_s. \tag{18}$$

In other words, $(\sigma_s, \mu_s)$ must lie approximately on or below the line

$$\mu = (\mu_m - \sigma_m^2) + \sigma_m \sigma. \tag{19}$$

This line, which we call the capital market line (CML), is the tangent to the CMP at $(\sigma_m, \mu_m)$. 

Figure 3: The capital market line (CML). This is the line tangent to the capital market parabola at $(\sigma_m, \mu_m)$. Our efficient market hypothesis implies that the volatility-return pair for a particular security or portfolio $s$ should fall approximately on or below this line, even when a speculator cannot sell $s$ short.
2.4 Shorting $s$ to Go Longer in $m$: The Long-Short CAPM

If our speculator is allowed to short $s$ in order to go longer in $m$, then he can take $\epsilon$ past zero into negative territory. This means extending the trajectory in the direction it is pointing as it approaches $(\sigma_m, \mu_m)$.

We evidently have a problem if the trajectory approaches the CMP as in Fig. 2. In such a case, extending the trajectory past $(\sigma_m, \mu_m)$ by going short in $s$ a small amount $\epsilon$ means extending the trajectory above the CMP, in contradiction to our efficient market hypothesis. So such trajectories are ruled out when the speculator is allowed to sell $s$ short.

There are only two conditions under which selling $s$ short by a small amount $\epsilon$ will not move the speculator above the CMP:

1. If the partial derivatives $[13]$ and $[14]$ are both zero, then selling $s$ short by a small amount $\epsilon$ will have no first-order effect; the pair $(\sigma_p, \mu_p)$ will remain approximately equal to $(\sigma_m, \mu_m)$.

2. If the trajectory is approximately tangent to the CMP at $(\sigma_m, \mu_m)$, as in Fig. 4 then the speculator will remain under the CMP even if he can extend the trajectory a small amount past $(\sigma_m, \mu_m)$. 
The long-short CAPM,
\[ \mu_s \approx \mu_m - \sigma_m^2 + \sigma_{sm}, \]
holds under both conditions. It holds under the first condition because \( \mu_s - \mu_m \) and \( \sigma_{sm} - \sigma_m^2 \) are both zero. It holds under the second condition because the slope \( \sigma_m \) is approximately \( \sigma_m \).

It may be helpful to elaborate some further implications of the first of the two conditions. From \( \mu_s - \mu_m = 0 \), we find that \( \mu_p \) is constant: \( \mu_p = \mu_s = \mu_m \). From \( \sigma_{sm} - \sigma_m^2 = 0 \), we find that \( s = m + e \), where \( e \) is orthogonal to \( m \), so that \( p = m + \epsilon e \) and \( \sigma_p^2 = \sigma_m^2 + \epsilon^2 \sigma_e^2 \). Geometrically, this means that the trajectory approaches \((\sigma_m, \mu_m)\) directly from the east as \( \epsilon \) moves from 1 down to 0, and then eventually moves directly back east as \( \epsilon \) moves substantially into negative territory.

3 Quantifying Our Efficient Market Hypotheses

No matter what market, what period of time, and what index \( m \) we choose, we can retrospectively find strategies and perhaps even securities that do beat \( m \) by a substantial factor. A strategy that shifts at the beginning of each day to those securities that increase in price the most that day will usually beat any index spectacularly. So what do we mean when we say that a speculator cannot beat \( m \) by a substantial factor? We mean that we do not expect any particular speculator (or any particular security, portfolio, or strategy selected in advance) to do much better than the market. We do not expect the speculator’s final wealth to exceed by a large factor the final wealth that he would have achieved simply by investing his initial wealth in the market index \( m \). The larger the factor, the stronger our expectation. If \( \alpha \) is a positive number very close to zero, and the speculator starts with initial wealth equal to one monetary unit, then we strongly expect his final wealth will be less than \( \frac{1}{\alpha} W_m \), where \( W_m \) is the final wealth obtained by investing one monetary unit in \( m \) at the outset. This is an expectation about the market’s behavior: the market will follow a course that makes the speculator’s wealth less than \( \frac{1}{\alpha} W_m \).

In this section, we review some ideas from [6], where this way of quantifying efficient market hypotheses is given a natural game-theoretic foundation. In Subsection 3.1, we formulate the basic capital asset pricing game (basic CAPG). In Subsections 3.2 and 3.3, we discuss how this game, in itself only a mathematical object, can be used to model securities markets. In Subsection 3.4, we define two variations on the basic CAPG, which provide the settings for the precise mathematical formulations of the long CAPM and the long-short CAPM that we present later, in Section 4.

3.1 The Basic Capital Asset Pricing Game

The capital asset pricing game has two principal players, Speculator and Market, who alternate play. In each round, Speculator decides how much of each security in the market to hold (and possibly short), and then Market
determines Speculator’s gain by deciding how the prices of the securities change. Allied with Market is a third player, Investor, who also invests each day. The game is a perfect-information game: each player sees the others’ moves.

We assume that there are \( K + 1 \) securities in the market and \( N \) rounds (trading periods) in the game. We number the securities from 0 to \( K \) and the rounds from 1 to \( N \), and we write \( x_n^k \) for the simple return on security \( k \) in round \( n \). For simplicity, we assume that \( -1 < x_n^k < \infty \) for all \( k \) and \( n \); a security price never becomes zero. We write \( x_n \) for the vector \((x_0^0, \ldots, x_n^K)\), which lies in \((-1, \infty)^{K+1}\). Market determines the returns; \( x_n \) is his move in the \( n \)th round. We assume that the first security, indexed by 0, is our market index \( m \); thus \( x_n^0 \) is the same as \( m_n \), the simple return of the market index \( m \) in round \( n \). If \( m \) is a portfolio formed from the other securities, then \( x_n^0 \) is an average of the \( x_n^1, \ldots, x_n^K \), but we do not insist on this.

We write \( M_n \) for the wealth at the end of round \( n \) resulting from investing one monetary unit in \( m \) at the beginning of the game:

\[
M_n := \prod_{i=1}^{n} (1 + x_i^0) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} (1 + m_i).
\]

Thus \( M_N \) is the final wealth resulting from this investment. This is the quantity we earlier designated by \( W_m \).

Investor begins with capital equal to one monetary unit and is allowed to redistribute his current capital across all \( K + 1 \) securities in each round. If we write \( G_n \) for his wealth at the end of the \( n \)th round, then

\[
G_n := \prod_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{k=0}^{K} g_{k}^{i} (1 + x_i^k),
\]

where \( g_{k}^{i} \) is the fraction of his wealth he holds in security \( k \) during the \( i \)th round. This is negative if he is selling \( k \) short. The \( g_{k}^{i} \) must sum to 1 over \( k \). Investor’s final wealth is \( G_N \). Thus \( G_N \) is the same as what we earlier called \( W_s \). We will also write \( s_n \) for Investor’s simple return in round \( n \):

\[
s_n := \frac{G_n - G_{n-1}}{G_{n-1}} = \sum_{k} g_{k}^{n} x_{n}^k.
\]

(20)

We call the set of all possible sequences \((g_1, x_1, \ldots, g_N, x_N)\) the sample space of the game, and we designate it by \( \Omega \). We call any subset of \( \Omega \) an event. Any statement about Investor’s returns determines an event, as does any comparison of Investor’s and Market’s returns.

Speculator also starts with one monetary unit and is allowed to redistribute his current capital across all \( K + 1 \) securities in each round. We write \( H_n \) for his wealth at the end of the \( n \)th round:

\[
H_n := \prod_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{k=0}^{K} h_{k}^{i} (1 + x_i^k),
\]

15
where $h^k_i$ is the fraction of his wealth he holds in security $k$ during the $i$th round. The moves by Speculator are not recorded in the sample space; they do not define events.

To complete the specification of the game, we select a number $\alpha$ and an event $A$, and we agree that Speculator will win the game if he beats the index by the factor $\frac{1}{\alpha}$ or if $A$ happens. The number $\alpha$ is our significance level, and the event $A$ is Speculator’s auxiliary goal. This auxiliary goal might, for example, be the event that Investor’s average simple return $\mu_s$ approximates $\mu_m - \sigma^2_m + \sigma_{sm}$ to some specified accuracy.

Basic Capital Asset Pricing Game (Basic CAPG)

Players: Investor, Market, Speculator

Parameters:
- Natural number $K$ (number of non-index securities in the market)
- Natural number $N$ (number of rounds or trading periods)
- Real number $\alpha$ satisfying $0 < \alpha \leq 1$ (significance level)
- $A \subseteq \Omega$ (auxiliary goal)

Protocol:

Initial states:
- $G_0 := 1.$
- $H_0 := 1.$
- $M_0 := 1.$

FOR $n = 1, 2, \ldots, N$:
- Investor selects $g_n \in \mathbb{R}^{K+1}$ such that $\sum_{k=0}^{K} g^k_n = 1.$
- Speculator selects $h_n \in \mathbb{R}^{K+1}$ such that $\sum_{k=0}^{K} h^k_n = 1.$
- Market selects $x_n \in (-1, \infty)^{K+1}.$

State transitions:
- $G_n := G_{n-1} \sum_{k=0}^{K} g^k_n (1 + x^k_n).$
- $H_n := H_{n-1} \sum_{k=0}^{K} h^k_n (1 + x^k_n).$
- $M_n := M_{n-1} (1 + x^0_n).$

Winner: Speculator wins if $H_n \geq 0$ for $n = 1, \ldots, N$ and either (1) $H_N \geq \frac{1}{\alpha} M_N$ or (2) $(g_1, x_1, \ldots, g_N, x_N) \in A.$ Otherwise Investor and Market win.

The requirement that Speculator keep $H_n$ nonnegative in order to win formalizes the idea that he has limited means. It ensures that when $H_N \geq \frac{1}{\alpha} M_N,$ he really has turned an initial capital of only one monetary unit into $\frac{1}{\alpha} M_N.$ If he were allowed to continue on to the $(n+1)$st round when $H_n < 0,$ he would be borrowing money—i.e., drawing on a larger capital—and if he then finally achieved $H_N \geq \frac{1}{\alpha} M_N,$ it would not be fair to credit him with doing so with his limited initial means of only one monetary unit. Because Speculator must keep $H_n$ always nonnegative in order to win, a strategy for Speculator cannot guarantee his winning if it permits the other players to force $H_n < 0$ for some $n$. In other words, a winning strategy for Speculator cannot risk bankruptcy.

Formally, the basic CAPG allows Speculator to sell securities short. However, if Speculator sells security $k$ short in round $n$, then Market has the option of making the return $x^k_n$ so large that $H_n$ becomes negative, resulting
in Speculator’s immediately losing the game. So no winning strategy for Speculator can involve short selling. In Subsection 3.4 we discuss how the rules of the game can be modified to make short selling a real possibility for Speculator.

3.2 Predictions from the Efficient Market Hypothesis

In order for Speculator to win our game, either he must become very rich relative to the market index \( m \) (he beats \( m \) by the factor \( \frac{1}{\alpha} \)) or else the event \( A \) must happen. In the next section, we will show that for certain choices of \( A \) and \( \alpha \), Speculator can win—he has a winning strategy. But our efficient market hypothesis predicts that the market will not allow him to become very rich relative to \( m \), and this implies that \( A \) will happen. In this sense, our efficient market hypothesis predicts that \( A \) will happen.

To formalize this idea, we make the following definition: The efficient market hypothesis for \( m \) predicts the event \( A \) at level \( \alpha \) if Speculator has a winning strategy in the basic CAPG with \( A \) as the auxiliary goal and \( \alpha \) as the significance level.

As we explained earlier, our confidence that Speculator will not beat the market by \( \frac{1}{\alpha} \) is greater for smaller \( \alpha \). So a prediction of \( A \) at level \( \alpha \) becomes more emphatic as \( \alpha \) decreases.

3.3 Is the Game Realistic?

We relate the game to an actual securities market by thinking of Investor as a particular individual investor or fund. Investor may do whatever a real investor may do: he may follow some particular static strategy (hold only a particular security or portfolio); he may follow some particular dynamic strategy; or he may play opportunistically, without any strategy chosen in advance. Market represents all the other participants in the market. Because Market and Investor play the game as a team against Speculator, we can even think of Market as representing all the participants in the market, including Investor.

Speculator need not represent a real investor. He represents the hypothetical investor referred to by our efficient market hypothesis: he cannot multiply his initial capital by a substantial factor relative to the index \( m \). We have Speculator move after Investor so that he knows what Investor is doing with his capital and can replicate it with part of his own capital.

The winning strategies for Speculator that we construct to prove our propositions are simple: Speculator mixes Investor’s moves with \( m \), perhaps going short in Investor’s moves to go longer in \( m \). Because these simple strategies are sufficient, the efficient market hypothesis that we need in order to draw our practical conclusions from the propositions is sometimes relatively weak. Instead of assuming that no speculator can beat the market by a large factor, no matter how smart and imaginative he is, it is enough to assume that no speculator can beat \( m \) by a large factor using strategies at most slightly more
complicated than those used by the investors or funds whose performance we are studying.

3.4 The Long and Long-Short Capital Asset Pricing Games

We do not actually use the basic CAPG for our mathematical work in the next section. Instead, we use two variations, which we call the long CAPG and the long-short CAPG.

Both the long CAPG and the long-short CAPG are obtained from the basic CAPG by restricting how the players can move:

- The long CAPG is obtained by replacing the condition $g_n \in \mathbb{R}^{K+1}$ in the protocol for the basic CAPG by the condition $g_n \in [0, \infty)^{K+1}$. In other words, INVESTOR is forbidden to sell securities short.

- The long-short CAPG has two extra parameters: a positive constant $C$ (perhaps very large), and a constant $\delta \in (0, 1)$ (perhaps very small). It is obtained by replacing the condition $g_n \in \mathbb{R}^{K+1}$ in the protocol for the basic CAPG by the condition $g_n \in [0, \infty)^{K+1}$ and replacing the condition $x_n \in (-1, \infty)^{K+1}$ by the conditions $x_n \in (-1, C)^{K+1}$ and $m_n \geq -1 + \delta$. (Remember that $m_n = x_0^n$.) In other words, INVESTOR is not allowed to sell short, and MARKET is constrained so that an individual security cannot increase too much in value in a single round and the market index $m$ cannot lose too much of its value in a single round. These constraints on INVESTOR and MARKET make it possible for SPECULATOR to go short in INVESTOR’s moves, at least a bit, without risking bankruptcy.

The concept of prediction is defined for these games just as for the basic CAPG: The efficient market hypothesis for $m$ predicts $A$ at level $\alpha$ for one of the games if SPECULATOR has a winning strategy in that game with $A$ as the auxiliary goal and $\alpha$ as the significance level. In Subsections 4.1 and 4.2 we show that certain events are predicted at level $\alpha$ in the long CAPG. In Subsections 4.3 and 4.4 we show that certain events are predicted at level $\alpha$ in the long-short CAPG.

Because MARKET remains unconstrained in the long CAPG, the lesson we learned for the basic CAPG at the end of Section 3.1 applies: No winning strategy for SPECULATOR can go short, because MARKET can bankrupt him whenever he does go short. This will be confirmed in Subsections 4.1 and 4.2 the strategies for SPECULATOR used there never go short. These strategies do need to go long in INVESTOR’s move, and this is why the condition that INVESTOR not sell short is needed as a rule of the long game. An alternative way of making sure that SPECULATOR can go long in INVESTOR’s move without risking bankruptcy would be to make it a rule of the game that INVESTOR and MARKET must move so that INVESTOR never goes bankrupt: they would be required to choose $g_n$ and $x_n$ so that $s_n > -1$ (see Eq. (20)).
We can similarly weaken the constraints on Investor and Market in the long-short CAPG: Require only that (1) \( m_n \geq -1 + \delta \) (the market index never drops too much in a single round) and (2) \(-1 < s_n \leq C\) (INVESTOR never becomes bankrupt and never makes too great a return in a single round).

4 Precise Mathematical Results

We now state four propositions that express precisely, within the game-theoretic framework, the assertions that we outlined informally in Section 1. Proofs of these propositions are provided in Appendix B.

To simplify the statement of the propositions, we define functions \( \Phi \) and \( \phi \) by

\[
\Phi(x) := \frac{1}{3} x^3 \quad \text{and} \quad \phi(x) := \frac{1}{3} \left( \frac{x}{1 + x} \right)^3.
\]

4.1 The Long CAPM

Our first proposition translates the approximate inequality that we call the long CAPM, Eq. (2), into a precise inequality.

**Proposition 1.** For any \( \alpha \in (0, 1] \) and any \( \epsilon \in (0, 1] \), the efficient market hypothesis for \( m \) predicts

\[
\mu_s - \mu_m + \sigma^2_m - \sigma_{sm} < E \frac{1}{\epsilon} + \ln \frac{1}{N\epsilon} + \frac{\epsilon \sigma^2_{s-m}}{2}
\]

at level \( \alpha \) in the long CAPG, where

\[
E := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} \left( \Phi(m_n) - \phi((1 - \epsilon)m_n + \epsilon s_n) \right).
\]

The quantity \( E \) bounds the accuracy of the fundamental approximation. It is awkwardly complicated because we have made the bound as tight as possible. In theory, \( E \) can be negative, but it is typically positive, and certainly the right-hand side of (21) as a whole is typically positive.

Although Proposition 1 is valid as stated, for any natural number \( N \), any \( \alpha \in (0, 1] \), and any \( \epsilon \in (0, 1] \), its theoretical significance is greatest when these parameters are chosen so that the right-hand side of (21) is small in absolute value relative to the typical size of the individual terms on the left-hand side, \( \mu_s, \mu_m, \sigma^2_m, \) and \( \sigma_{sm} \). When this is so, (21) can be read roughly as \( \mu_s - \mu_m + \sigma^2_m - \sigma_{sm} \lesssim 0 \), or \( \mu_s \lesssim \mu_m - \sigma^2_m + \sigma_{sm} \).

In this paragraph, we will use the phrase relatively small to mean “small in absolute value relative to the typical size of \( \mu_s, \mu_m, \sigma^2_m, \) and \( \sigma_{sm} \).” In order for the right-hand side of (21) to be relatively small, we need all three of its terms to be relatively small. To see what this involves, let us look at these three terms individually:
• The theoretical performance deficit $\sigma^2_{s-m}/2$, which measures $s$’s lack of diversification, is typically of the same order of magnitude as $\mu_s$, $\mu_m$, $\sigma^2_m$, and $\sigma_{sm}$. So we need to make $\epsilon$ small.

• To make our efficient market hypothesis realistic, we must choose $\alpha$ significantly less than one. So in order to make the term $\frac{\ln(1/\alpha)}{N\epsilon}$ relatively small, we must make the number of rounds $N$ large even relative to $1/\epsilon$. Because the typical size of $\mu_s$, $\mu_m$, $\sigma^2_m$, and $\sigma_{sm}$ decrease when the time period for each round is made shorter, it is not enough to make $N$ large by making these individual time periods short. We must make the total period of time studied long.

• Once we have chosen a small $\epsilon$, we must make $E$ extremely small in order to make $E/\epsilon$ relatively small. Because $E$ is essentially the difference between two averages of the third moments of the returns, we can make it extremely small by making the individual trading periods sufficiently short.

To summarize, we can hope to get a tight bound in (21) only if we choose $\epsilon$ small and consider frequent returns (perhaps daily returns) over a long period of time.

These points can be made much more clearly by a more formal analysis of the asymptotics. Fix arbitrarily small $\alpha > 0$ and $\epsilon > 0$. (We make $\epsilon$ small because we need it small; we make $\alpha$ small to show that we can tolerate it small.) Suppose trading happens during an interval of time $[0,T]$ that is split into $N$ subintervals of length $dt = T/N$, and let $T \to \infty$ and $dt \to 0$. We can expect that $s_n$ and $m_n$ will have the order of magnitude $(dt)^{1/2}$, $E$ will have the order of magnitude $(dt)^{3/2}$, and $\mu_s$, $\mu_m$, $\sigma^2_m$, $\sigma_{sm}$, $\sigma^2_{s-m}$ will all have the order of magnitude $dt$; this holds both in the usual theory of diffusion processes and in the game-theoretic framework (for a partial explanation, see [6], Chapter 9). So the right-hand side of (21) will not exceed $O\left( (dt)^{3/2} + \frac{\epsilon}{N} \right) + \frac{\epsilon^2}{2} \sigma^2_{s-m}$. For small enough $\epsilon$, this should be much less than $dt$, the typical order of magnitude for $\mu_s$, $\mu_m$, $\sigma^2_m$, and $\sigma_{sm}$.

The data we consider in Section 5 are only monthly and cover only a few decades, and so they do not allow us to achieve the happy results suggested by these extreme asymptotics. In fact, the tightest bounds we can achieve with these data occur when we choose $\epsilon$ relatively large.

4.2 The Theoretical Performance Deficit for Long Markets

The next proposition is a precise statement about the theoretical performance deficit $\sigma^2_{s-m}/2$.

**Proposition 2.** For any $\alpha \in (0,1]$ and any $\epsilon \in (0,1]$, the efficient market hypothesis for $m$ predicts that

$$\frac{1}{N} \ln W_s - \frac{1}{N} \ln W_m + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_{s-m} < \frac{E_1}{\epsilon} + E_2 + \frac{\ln 2}{N\epsilon} + \frac{\epsilon}{2} \sigma^2_{s-m}$$
at level $\alpha$ in the long CAPG, where

$$E_1 := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} \left( \Phi(m_n) - \phi((1 - \epsilon)m_n + \epsilon s_n) \right)$$

and

$$E_2 := \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} \left( \Phi(s_n) - \phi(m_n) \right).$$

This time we have broken the error stemming from the fundamental approximation into two parts. The first part, $E_1/\epsilon$, usually increases as $\epsilon$ is made smaller, while the second part, $E_2$, is not affected by $\epsilon$.

Again, we aim to choose $\alpha$ and $\epsilon$ so that $\alpha$ defines a reasonable efficient market hypothesis but the total error, in this case

$$\frac{E_1}{\epsilon} + E_2 + \ln \frac{1}{\alpha} + \frac{\epsilon}{2} \sigma_{s-m}^2,$$

is small. When this is achieved, the proposition says that $\frac{1}{N} \ln W_s - \frac{1}{N} \ln W_m + \frac{1}{2} \sigma_{s-m}^2 \lesssim 0$, or

$$\frac{1}{N} \ln W_m - \frac{1}{N} \ln W_s \gtrsim \frac{1}{2} \sigma_{s-m}^2.$$

In order for this to validate the theoretical performance deficit $\sigma_{s-m}^2/2$ as a measure of $s$’s performance, we need the error (23) to be small relative to all three terms in this approximate inequality. This evidently requires $\epsilon$ itself to be small. When $\epsilon = 1$, (23) is larger than $\sigma_{s-m}^2/2$.

4.3 The Long-Short CAPM

Now we turn to the long-short case.

**Proposition 3.** For any $\epsilon \in \left(0, \frac{\delta}{1 + C}\right)$ and $\alpha \in (0, 1]$, the efficient market hypothesis for $m$ predicts that

$$\left| \mu_s - \mu_m + \sigma_m^2 - \sigma_{sm} \right| < \frac{E_1}{\epsilon} + \ln \frac{1}{\alpha} + \frac{\epsilon}{2} \sigma_{s-m}^2$$

at level $\alpha$ in the long-short CAPG with parameters $C$ and $\delta$, where

$$E := \max_{j \in \{-1, 1\}} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} \left( \Phi(m_n) - \phi((1 - j\epsilon)m_n + j\epsilon s_n) \right).$$

4.4 The Theoretical Performance Deficit for Long-Short Markets

**Proposition 4.** For any $\alpha \in (0, 1]$ and any $\epsilon \in \left(0, \frac{\delta}{1 + C}\right)$, the efficient market hypothesis for $m$ predicts

$$\left| \frac{1}{N} \ln W_s - \frac{1}{N} \ln W_m + \frac{1}{2} \sigma_{s-m}^2 \right| < \frac{E_1}{\epsilon} + E_2 + \ln \frac{1}{\alpha} + \frac{\epsilon}{2} \sigma_{s-m}^2.$$
at level $\alpha$ in the long-short CAPG, where

$$E_1 := \max_{j \in \{-1, 1\}} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} \left( \Phi(m_n) - \phi((1 - j\epsilon)m_n + j\epsilon s_n) \right)$$

and

$$E_2 := \max \left( \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} \left( \Phi(s_n) - \phi(m_n) \right), \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} \left( \Phi(m_n) - \phi(s_n) \right) \right).$$

5 Some Empirical Examples

In this section, we check the game-theoretic CAPM’s predictions against data on returns over three or four decades for a few well known stocks. We also investigate what the game-theoretic CAPM says about the equity premium by looking at two much longer sequences of returns for government and commercial bonds, one for the United States and one for Britain. All our tests use monthly data, with significance level $\alpha = 0.5$, corresponding to the hypothesis that Speculator cannot do twice as well as the market index $m$, and mixing coefficient $\epsilon = 1$.

Empirical tests of the classical CAPM do not emphasize returns on individual stocks. The classical CAPM cannot be tested at all until it is combined with additional hypotheses about the variability of individual securities, and in order to avoid putting the weight of a test on these additional hypotheses, one emphasizes portfolios, sometimes across entire industries, instead of individual securities. Moreover, even studies on returns from portfolios tend to be inconclusive, because of the substantial remaining variability orthogonal to the market and because the additional hypotheses still play a large role. Because the efficient market hypothesis is much weaker than the assumptions that go into the classical CAPM, we do not expect the game-theoretic CAPM to provide tighter bounds than the classical CAPM. So in order to find examples where the game-theoretic CAPM provides reasonably tight bounds on the relation between average return and volatility, or where the theoretical performance deficit provides an interesting bound on performance, we will probably need to look at large portfolios.

Moreover, the asymptotic analysis in Section 4.1 suggests that we will need to look at longer periods of time, perhaps with data sampled daily, in order to get tight bounds. And even a good understanding of how often the efficient market hypothesis at a given significance level is valid for individual securities in a given market would require a comprehensive and careful study, with due attention to survivorship bias and other biases.

This section should, however, make clear how our results can be applied to data. It shows the kinds of bounds that the game-theoretic CAPM can achieve with no assumptions beyond the level $\alpha$ for the efficient market hypothesis.
Table 1: The Twelve Stocks. The number $N$, the number of monthly returns, is one less than the number of months for which we have data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Ticker Code</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>$N$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>January 1962–June 2001</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microsoft</td>
<td>MSFT</td>
<td>March 1986–June 2001</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boeing</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>January 1970–June 2001</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Du Pont (E.I.) de Nemours</td>
<td>DD</td>
<td>January 1970–June 2001</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Edison</td>
<td>ED</td>
<td>January 1970–June 2001</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastman Kodak</td>
<td>EK</td>
<td>January 1970–June 2001</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Motors</td>
<td>GM</td>
<td>January 1970–June 2001</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT&amp;T</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>January 1970–June 2001</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texaco</td>
<td>TX</td>
<td>January 1970–June 2001</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1 Twelve Stocks

The twelve stocks we now consider are listed in Table 1. They are hardly a random or representative sample. We chose them because of their familiarity. We did choose them, however, before making the calculations shown here; no other companies were chosen and then omitted because of the results they gave.

As the market index $m$, we use the S&P 500. Our data are from Yahoo.

As we have already mentioned, we use $\alpha = 0.5$ and $\epsilon = 1$. The rationale for this choice in the long-short case is slightly different than in the long case.

- In the long-short case, the choice $\epsilon = 1$ is theoretically problematic, because Propositions 3 and 4 require $\epsilon < \frac{\delta}{1+C}$, while the values of $\delta$ and $C$ for which the returns from the companies would satisfy the conditions of the long-short game would make $\frac{\delta}{1+C}$ less than one. But it is nevertheless the most informative choice: (1) it gives tighter bounds than any other $\epsilon \in (0,1]$ for all twelve companies, and (2) these tightest bounds are satisfied by most of the twelve companies, and this makes it clear that they are also satisfied for other choices of $\epsilon$. It is also true that $\delta$ can be chosen close enough to 1 and $C$ close enough to 0 that $\epsilon$ can be made close enough to 1 as to produce legitimate bounds approximately equal to the ones we obtain for $\epsilon = 1$.

- In the long case, the choice $\epsilon = 1$ is theoretically allowed. It does not always produce the tightest bounds, but the difference is never very great, and there is no clear rationale for choosing any other particular value of $\epsilon$ in advance of seeing the data.

With $\alpha = 0.5$ and $\epsilon = 1$, the CAPM inequalities are:

- Long-Short CAPM Inequality (Proposition 3) with $\alpha = 0.5$ and
of unusual events that could not have been anticipated, and for this reason the long-short inequality (68.9) reduces to 266.6. Microsoft’s spectacular performance violated both the long-short inequality and the long inequality for our twelve companies. These inequalities for our twelve companies.

In Table 2, we report numerical values for the twelve stocks discussed in Subsection 5.1 and the two bond series discussed in Subsection 5.2. We give the ratio $W_s/W_m$, a direct measure of performance. All other numerical values are in basis points (1bp = 0.0001). The numbers not in parentheses are for the long-short inequality (Proposition 3). LHS, with the minus signs removed, is the left-hand side of that inequality; RHS is the right-hand side. For the long inequality (Proposition 1), use the values in parentheses for RHS and $E$, halve the value of $\frac{2\ln 2}{N}$, and restore the minus sign on the LHS.

Table 2: CAPM Empirical Results. This table gives numerical values for the twelve stocks discussed in Subsection 5.1 and the two bond series discussed in Subsection 5.2. In parentheses after the ticker code for the stock (or the abbreviation USA or UK) we give the ratio $W_s/W_m$, a direct measure of performance. All other numerical values are in basis points (1bp = 0.0001). The numbers not in parentheses are for the long-short inequality (Proposition 3). LHS, with the minus signs removed, is the left-hand side of that inequality; RHS is the right-hand side. For the long inequality (Proposition 1), use the values in parentheses for RHS and $E$, halve the value of $\frac{2\ln 2}{N}$, and restore the minus sign on the LHS.

$$\epsilon = 1$$

$$\left| \mu_s - \mu_m + \sigma_m^2 - \sigma_{sm} \right| < E + \frac{2\ln 2}{N} + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_{s-m}^2.$$ 

- Long CAPM Inequality (Proposition 1) with $\alpha = 0.5$ and $\epsilon = 1$

$$\mu_s - \mu_m + \sigma_m^2 - \sigma_{sm} < E + \frac{2\ln 2}{N} + \frac{1}{2}\sigma_{s-m}^2.$$  

(remember that both $E$ and $N$ depend on the stock, and $E$ is not the same in the long as in the long-short case.) In Table 2, we report numerical values for these inequalities for our twelve companies.

Microsoft and Sears are the only stocks for which our bounds do not hold. Microsoft’s spectacular performance violated both the long-short inequality (which reduces to 266.6 < 142.9 in this case) and the long inequality (which reduces to 266.6 < 97.1). Sears’s impressive underperformance violated the long-short inequality (68.0 < 65.5) but not, of course, the long inequality (−68.0 < 47.1). Both performances can reasonably be put into the category of unusual events that could not have been anticipated, and for this reason the
violations do not make us uncomfortable with our efficient market hypothesis. One other stock, AT&T, also falls outside our expectations. Our bounds hold for this stock, but the error in the fundamental approximation \((E = 217.3)\) is so great that these bounds are uninteresting; this error seems to be the result of a fall in share price from 32.52 to 8.34 in a single month, February 1984.

The information in Table 2 is sufficient to enable the reader to calculate our bounds for any other significance level \(\alpha\) and for any other mixing coefficient \(\epsilon\).

Now we consider how well the twelve companies satisfy the bounds our theory gives for the theoretical performance deficit (TPD). In this case, we are considering the following inequalities:

- **Long-Short TPD Inequality (Proposition 4)** with \(\alpha = 0.5\) and \(\epsilon = 1\)

\[
| \frac{1}{N} \ln W_s - \frac{1}{N} \ln W_m + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_{s-m} | < E_1 + E_2 + \frac{2 \ln 2}{N} + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_{s-m}.
\]

- **Long TPD Inequality (Proposition 2)** with \(\alpha = 0.5\) and \(\epsilon = 1\)

\[
\frac{1}{N} \ln W_s - \frac{1}{N} \ln W_m + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_{s-m} < E_1 + E_2 + \frac{\ln 2}{N} + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2_{s-m}.
\]

As we noted in the preceding section, we do not get interesting bounds for the theoretical performance deficit when \(\epsilon = 1\), and this is evident here from the fact that the deficit appears on both sides of each inequality. We can nevertheless look at the bounds as a check on our efficient market hypothesis. Table 3 reports results for the same companies and the same periods as Table 2. On the whole, the numbers are quite close to those in Table 2 but this time only Microsoft violates the bounds.

**5.2 The Equity Premium**

We can apply the game-theoretic CAPM to bonds as well as to stocks, provided that we adopt the appropriate efficient market hypothesis: a speculator cannot substantially beat the index \(m\) when he is allowed to hold (and also short, if we want to apply the long-short CAPM) both \(m\) and the bonds. We now report on the results of applying the model to two series of bond returns, one American and one British. The sources of our data are listed in Table 4, and our results are summarized in the last two rows of Tables 2 and 3.

The numbers in Table 2 confirm the usual result that bonds fall below the security market line: \(\mu_s - \mu_m + \sigma^2_m - \sigma_{sm}\) is negative for both series. For the American series, this CAPM deficit is \(-25.1\)bp, and for the British series, it is \(-7.3\)bp. Because these values are negative, the long CAPM is automatically satisfied.

The long-short CAPM is also satisfied for both series (25.1 < 35.6 and 7.3 < 13.2). These are only the results for \(\alpha = 0.5\) and \(\epsilon = 1\), but because the error \(E\) in the fundamental approximation is substantial, changing these parameters
Table 3: **TPD Empirical Results.** The same conventions are used as in the preceding table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>( \ln \text{in } W_a )</th>
<th>( \ln \text{in } W_m )</th>
<th>( \frac{1}{2} \sigma_{W-a}^2 ) LHS</th>
<th>RHS</th>
<th>( E_1 + E_2 )</th>
<th>( \frac{1}{4} \text{in } 2 )</th>
<th>( \frac{1}{4} \sigma_{W-a}^2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>-15.0</td>
<td>47.0 (32.2)</td>
<td>1.4 (1.2)</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>39.4 (24.4)</td>
<td>1.3 (0.8)</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSFT</td>
<td>324.9</td>
<td>110.8</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>273.2</td>
<td>152.4 (106.6)</td>
<td>17.6 (9.7)</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td>114.7</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>79.6 (57.9)</td>
<td>7.4 (4.1)</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>53.8 (34.6)</td>
<td>2.0 (1.2)</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ED</td>
<td>107.7</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>88.7 (55.3)</td>
<td>27.1 (12.1)</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EK</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>-38.7</td>
<td>58.2 (38.6)</td>
<td>3.1 (1.8)</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GM</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>-10.7</td>
<td>58.7 (39.9)</td>
<td>2.2 (1.8)</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PG</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
<td>54.7 (34.9)</td>
<td>3.1 (1.7)</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>-69.3</td>
<td>71.8 (46.7)</td>
<td>12.8 (6.6)</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>-9.4</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>-82.7</td>
<td>498.2 (259.4)</td>
<td>434.7 (214.3)</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>57.9 (37.9)</td>
<td>2.9 (1.2)</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>-25.3</td>
<td>35.9 (16.8)</td>
<td>15.4 (6.7)</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
<td>16.0 (8.9)</td>
<td>6.3 (1.1)</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The amount by which bonds fall below the security market line can be thought of as the *equity premium*—a premium paid for holding equity that has the same covariance with the market as bond. Our results show that an equity premium may exist but that it remains within the bounds of our model and hence does not violate our efficient market hypothesis.

### 6 Discussion

The purpose of this article is to introduce, as clearly as possible, a completely game-theoretic capital asset pricing model, derived from an efficient market hypothesis alone, with no assumptions about the beliefs or preferences of investors. The efficient market hypothesis is very weak; as we have seen, it really says only that a speculator cannot beat the market by a substantial factor using some rather obvious strategies. The predictions of this game-theoretic model are loose, in the sense that they give fairly wide bounds on the relation between average return and covariance with the market. But these bounds are themselves quite precise and can therefore be tested with no auxiliary stochastic model for individual returns. Because of this precision, the new game-theoretic model compares favorably with the classical CAPM, raising the question of whether the classical model’s much stronger assumptions give it any greater predictive power. It also raises the question of whether the established generalizations of the classical CAPM, which also rely on stochastic assumptions and on assumptions about the beliefs and preferences of investors, are headed in the
Table 4: The Two Bond Series. These two series of bond returns were obtained from Global Financial Data (GFD). In the case of the British series, the GFD files listed were supplemented by earlier data provided to us directly by GFD’s Bryan Taylor. Once again, the number $N$ of monthly returns is one less than the number of months for which we have data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>American Series</th>
<th>British Series</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>1565</td>
<td>3612</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$s$</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>United Kingdom 10-year Bond Total Return Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA Total Return</td>
<td>Government Bond Total Return Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFD File</td>
<td>TRUSABIM.csv</td>
<td>TRGBRGVM.csv</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$m$</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>UK FT-Actuaries All-Share Total Return Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S&amp;P 500 Composite Total Return Index</td>
<td>UK FT-Actuaries All-Share Total Return Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFD File</td>
<td>TRSPXM.csv</td>
<td>_TFTASM.csv</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

right direction. The game-theoretic approach, which begins with an appropriate recognition of the role of speculation in governing the market, may be more fruitful.

Acknowledgments

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References


A Lower and Upper Probability

Starting with our notion of prediction at level $\alpha$, we can recover the definitions of upper and lower probability mentioned in the introduction.

Prediction at level $\alpha$ being more emphatic when $\alpha$ is smaller, it is natural to code prediction at level $\alpha$ as belief of strength $1 - \alpha$. For example, when $A$ is predicted at the 5% level, we might assert 95% belief in $A$’s happening. Taking lower probability to be strength of belief in this sense leads to $\mathbb{P}_A = 1 - \alpha_A$, where

$$\alpha_A := \inf\{\alpha \mid 0 < \alpha \leq 1 \text{ and EMH predicts } A \text{ at level } \alpha\}, \quad (24)$$

EMH being our efficient market hypothesis. Roughly speaking (because the infimum in (24) might not be attained), this says that $\mathbb{P}_A$ is the degree of belief corresponding to the smallest $\alpha$ such that $A$ is predicted at level $\alpha$. Because Speculator has a winning strategy for the goal $A$ when $\alpha = 1$ (buy and hold security 0), we always have $0 \leq \alpha_A \leq 1$ and hence $0 \leq \mathbb{P}_A \leq 1$.

The relationship $\mathbb{P}_A = 1 - \mathbb{P}_A^c$ gives

$$\mathbb{P}_A = \inf\{\alpha \mid 0 < \alpha \leq 1 \text{ and EMH predicts } A^c \text{ at level } \alpha\}$$

$$= \inf\{\alpha \mid 0 < \alpha \leq 1 \text{ and Speculator can multiply his capital by } \frac{1}{\alpha}$$

$$\text{without risking bankruptcy if } A \text{ happens}\}.$$ \quad (25)
This agrees with the definition of upper probability in the introduction. It can be shown, using the fact that Speculator cannot make money for sure in the game, that \( \mathbb{P} A \leq \mathbb{P} A \) (see [6], pp. 14–15).

We can restate Propositions 1–4 in terms of lower probability as follows:

**Corollary 1.** In the long CAPG,

\[
\mathbb{P} \left\{ \mu_s - \mu_m + \sigma_m^2 - \sigma_{sm} < \frac{E}{\epsilon} + \frac{1}{N \epsilon} + \frac{\epsilon \sigma_{s-m}^2}{2} \right\} \geq 1 - \alpha
\]

and

\[
\mathbb{P} \left\{ \frac{1}{N} \ln W_s - \frac{1}{N} \ln W_m + \frac{1}{2} \sigma_{s-m}^2 < \frac{E_1}{\epsilon} + E_2 + \frac{1}{N \epsilon} + \frac{\epsilon \sigma_{s-m}^2}{2} \right\} \geq 1 - \alpha,
\]

for any \( \alpha \in (0, 1] \) and any \( \epsilon \in (0, 1] \), where \( E, E_1, \) and \( E_2 \) are defined as in the statements of Propositions 1 and 2. In the long-short CAPG with parameters \( C \) and \( \delta \),

\[
\mathbb{P} \left\{ |\mu_s - \mu_m + \sigma_m^2 - \sigma_{sm}| < \frac{E}{\epsilon} + \frac{2}{N \epsilon} + \frac{\epsilon \sigma_{s-m}^2}{2} \right\} \geq 1 - \alpha
\]

and

\[
\mathbb{P} \left\{ \left| \frac{1}{N} \ln W_s - \frac{1}{N} \ln W_m + \frac{1}{2} \sigma_{s-m}^2 \right| < \frac{E_1}{\epsilon} + E_2 + \frac{2}{N \epsilon} + \frac{\epsilon \sigma_{s-m}^2}{2} \right\} \geq 1 - \alpha,
\]

for any \( \alpha \in (0, 1] \) and any \( \epsilon \in \left(0, \frac{\delta}{1+C}\right) \), where \( E, E_1, \) and \( E_2 \) are defined as in the statements of Propositions 3 and 4.

These lower probability statements say exactly the same thing as Propositions 1–4: Speculator has a winning strategy in certain games.

**B Proofs**

**Proof of Proposition 1.** First we study the accuracy of the fundamental approximation. When \( x > -1 \), we can expand \( \ln(1 + x) \) in a Taylor’s series with remainder:

\[
\ln(1 + x) = x - \frac{x^2}{2} + \frac{x^3}{3} \left( 1 + \theta x \right)^{-1}, \tag{26}
\]

where \( \theta \), which depends on \( x \), satisfies \( 0 \leq \theta \leq 1 \). Since

\[
\phi(x) \leq \frac{1}{3} x^3 \frac{1}{(1 + \theta x)^3} \leq \Phi(x),
\]

we can see that (26) implies

\[
\ln(1 + x) \leq x - \frac{1}{2} x^2 + \Phi(x) \tag{27}
\]
\[
\ln(1 + x) \geq x - \frac{1}{2}x^2 + \phi(x). \tag{28}
\]

Notice that the functions \( \Phi \) and \( \phi \) are monotonically increasing.

Speculator has a trivial winning strategy in the long CAPG with any significance level \( \alpha \) and the auxiliary goal

\[
\prod_{n=1}^{N} (1 + \epsilon s_n + (1 - \epsilon)m_n) < \frac{1}{\alpha} \prod_{n=1}^{N} (1 + m_n).
\]

In each round, he invests \( \epsilon \) of his capital in \( s \) and \( 1 - \epsilon \) of his capital in \( m \). But we can rewrite this auxiliary goal as

\[
\sum_{n=1}^{N} \left( \ln (1 + \epsilon s_n + (1 - \epsilon)m_n) - \ln (1 + m_n) \right) < \ln \frac{1}{\alpha}.
\]

This implies

\[
\sum_{n=1}^{N} \left( \epsilon s_n + (1 - \epsilon)m_n - \frac{1}{2}\epsilon^2 s_n^2 - \frac{1}{2}(1 - \epsilon)^2 m_n^2 - \epsilon(1 - \epsilon)s_n m_n \\
+ \phi(\epsilon s_n + (1 - \epsilon)m_n) - m_n + \frac{1}{2}m_n^2 - \Phi(m_n) \right) < \ln \frac{1}{\alpha}
\]

or

\[
\sum_{n=1}^{N} \left( \epsilon (s_n - m_n + m_n^2 - s_n m_n) - \frac{1}{2}\epsilon^2 (s_n^2 + m_n^2 - 2s_n m_n) \\
+ \phi(\epsilon s_n + (1 - \epsilon)m_n) - \Phi(m_n) \right) < \ln \frac{1}{\alpha}.
\]

This completes the proof. \( \square \)

**Proof of Proposition 2.** Add the equality

\[
\frac{\sigma_{s-m}^2}{2} = \frac{\sigma_s^2}{2} + \frac{\sigma_m^2}{2} - \sigma_{sm} \tag{29}
\]

and the inequality

\[
\frac{1}{N} \ln W_s - \frac{1}{N} \ln W_m \\
\leq \left( \mu_s - \frac{1}{2}\sigma_s^2 + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} \Phi(s_n) \right) - \left( \mu_m - \frac{1}{2}\sigma_m^2 + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} \phi(m_n) \right)
\]

to the inequality in Proposition 1. \( \square \)

30
Proof of Proposition 3. We know from Proposition 1 (see Corollary 1) that
\[ \mathbb{P}\left\{ \mu_s - \mu_m + \sigma_m^2 - \sigma_{sm} < \frac{E}{\epsilon} + \frac{\ln \frac{2}{N \epsilon}}{\epsilon} + \frac{\epsilon \sigma_{s-m}^2}{2} \right\} \geq 1 - \frac{\alpha}{2}; \] (30)
therefore, it remains to prove
\[ \mathbb{P}\left\{ \mu_s - \mu_m + \sigma_m^2 - \sigma_{sm} > \frac{E}{\epsilon} + \frac{\ln \frac{2}{N \epsilon}}{\epsilon} + \frac{-\epsilon \sigma_{s-m}^2}{2} \right\} \geq 1 - \frac{\alpha}{2}. \] (31)
(Proposition 3 follows from (30), (31), and the inequality
\[ \mathbb{P}(A \cap B) \geq \mathbb{P}(A) + \mathbb{P}(B) - 1 \] from [6], Proposition 8.10.3 on p. 186.)
Consider a strategy for Speculator in the long-short CAPG that calls for investing \(-\epsilon\) of his capital in \(s\) and investing \(1 + \epsilon\) of his capital in \(m\) in every round. This strategy’s return in round \(n\) is
\[ -\epsilon s_n + (1 + \epsilon) m_n \geq -\epsilon C + (1 + \epsilon)(-1 + \delta) = -1 + \delta + \epsilon(-C - 1 + \delta) \]
\[ > -1 + \delta + \frac{\delta}{1 + C}(-C - 1) = -1 \]
(remember that \(\epsilon < \frac{\delta}{1 + C}\)) and so it does not risk bankruptcy for Speculator. It wins the game with the significance level \(\frac{\alpha}{2}\) and auxiliary goal
\[ \prod_{n=1}^{N} (1 - \epsilon s_n + (1 + \epsilon) m_n) < \frac{2}{\alpha} \prod_{n=1}^{N} (1 + m_n), \]
and the auxiliary goal can be transformed as follows (this is similar to the calculations in the proof of Proposition 1 with \(\epsilon\) replaced by \(-\epsilon\)):
\[ \sum_{n=1}^{N} \left( \ln (1 - \epsilon s_n + (1 + \epsilon) m_n) - \ln (1 + m_n) \right) < \ln \frac{2}{\alpha}; \]
\[ \sum_{n=1}^{N} \left( -\epsilon s_n + (1 + \epsilon) m_n - \frac{1}{2} \epsilon^2 s_n^2 - \frac{1}{2} (1 + \epsilon)^2 m_n^2 + \epsilon(1 + \epsilon)s_n m_n \right. \]
\[ \left. + \phi(-\epsilon s_n + (1 + \epsilon) m_n) - m_n + \frac{1}{2} m_n^2 - \Phi(m_n) \right) < \ln \frac{2}{\alpha}; \]
\[ \sum_{n=1}^{N} \left( -\epsilon (s_n - m_n + m_n^2 - s_n m_n) - \frac{1}{2} \epsilon^2 (s_n^2 + m_n^2 - 2 s_n m_n) \right. \]
\[ \left. + \phi((1 + \epsilon) m_n - \epsilon s_n) - \Phi(m_n) \right) < \ln \frac{2}{\alpha}. \]
This proves (31). 
\[ \square \]
Proof of Proposition 4. One half of this proposition is Proposition 2 (with $\alpha$ replaced by $\frac{\alpha}{2}$), and the other half is obtained by adding (29) and 

$$
\frac{1}{N} \ln W_s - \frac{1}{N} \ln W_m 
\geq \left( \mu_s - \frac{1}{2} \sigma_s^2 + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} \phi(s_n) \right) - \left( \mu_m - \frac{1}{2} \sigma_m^2 + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^{N} \Phi(m_n) \right)
$$

to the inner inequality in (31).

\[\square\]